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Rethinking the New Public Health 
Lindsay F. Wiley* 
Abstract 
This Article contributes to an emerging theoretical debate over 
the legitimate scope of public health law by linking it to a 
particular doctrinal debate in public nuisance law.  State and 
local governments have been largely stymied in their efforts to use 
public nuisance litigation against harmful industries to vindicate 
collectively-held, common law rights to non-interference with 
public health and safety.  The ways in which this litigation has 
failed are instructive for a broader movement in public health that 
is only just beginning to take shape. In response to evolving 
scientific understanding about the determinants of health, public 
health advocates are rapidly implementing new law and policy 
tools to alter our environments and behaviors in ways that 
improve health at the population level. Critics of this “new public 
health” movement seek to safeguard individual liberty by 
disconnecting the law and politics of public health from its 
science. They argue that modern health threats such as heart 
disease and diabetes are individual concerns not sufficiently 
public in nature to trigger doctrines that privilege state 
intervention over individual rights. Public health scholars 
engaged in this theoretical debate have overlooked a related 
doctrinal debate within public nuisance law in which courts have 
struggled to define the scope of “public rights,” including the right 
to non-interference with public health. In both debates, critics 
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have rightly insisted that the public must be more than the mere 
aggregation of private interests. But the narrower conceptions of 
the public that critics have put forth fail to account for the full 
scope of the state’s authority and responsibility for public health. 
This Article stakes out a middle position by adopting the 
classically liberal view of public health law critics—that state 
interference with individual liberty requires robust justification—
while also defining the public broadly so as to justify considerable 
state intervention under the banner of public health. Drawing on 
analysis of public nuisance litigation as a public health tool, I 
propose that epidemiological harms—which I define as those for 
which causation can be established at the population level, but not 
necessarily at the individual level—should be understood as 
public bads. This conception of the public provides a more robust 
justification for the new public health law movement that more 
firmly grounds it in the science of social epidemiology. 
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I. Introduction 
Public health is rapidly becoming a more invasive part of our 
everyday lives. Walk into a Starbucks in New York City and 
you’ll now see calorie counts listed on the menu.1 Buy a Coke in 
Washington, D.C. and you’ll pay a sin tax on it.2 A cupcake from 
your local bakery might taste a little different now that trans fats 
have been banned from the baker’s recipe.3 A session in your local 
tanning salon is now subject to a 10% federal excise tax.4 Soon, if 
you pick up a pack of cigarettes purchased in the United States, 
you might be brought face-to-face with a large, graphic image of a 
diseased lung, an autopsied corpse, or a mouth full of sores and 
rotten teeth.5 Public health is also becoming a more prominent 
                                                                                                     
 1. See generally Bryan Bollinger et al., Calorie Posting in Chain 
Restaurants, STANFORD GRADUATE SCH. BUS. NEWS (Jan. 2010), http:// 
www.gsb.stanford.edu/NEWS/StarbucksCaloriePostingStudy.pdf (presenting a 
study of data from Starbucks finding that calorie labeling on menus in 
compliance with New York City law decreased average calories per purchase 
and did not significantly harm revenues). 
 2. See Michael Nebauer, D.C. OKs Soda Tax, Rejects Income Tax Increase, 
WASH. BUS. J. (May 26, 2010), http://www.bizjournals.com/washington/stories/ 
2010/05/24/daily33.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2012) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 3. See M.E. Malone, Cooking Up Ways to Lose Trans Fat: New Ban has 
Bakers Adjusting their Recipes, BOSTON GLOBE (Feb. 25, 2009), available at 
http://www.boston.com/lifestyle/food/articles/2009/02/25/cooking_up_ways_to_los
e_trans_fat/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 4. See Internal Revenue Service, Excise Tax on Indoor Tanning Services 
Frequently Asked Questions (June 6, 2011), http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/ 
article/0,,id=224600,00.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2012) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 5. Catherine Pearson, New Cigarette Warnings Released, HUFFINGTON 
POST (June 21, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/20/cigarette-
warnings-labels-photos-fda_n_880885.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2012) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). In November 2011, a federal district 
court issued a preliminary injunction blocking implementation of the graphic 
warning requirement. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration, 11-CV-1482 (D.D.C. 2011), available at http://pubcit.typepad. 
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litigation risk for businesses. Manufacturers and distributors of 
harmful products like asbestos, tobacco, lead paint, and firearms 
are facing not only private plaintiffs, but also federal, state, and 
city attorneys.6 In their parens patriae capacity,7 governmental 
plaintiffs have brought public nuisance suits against these 
industries to vindicate collectively held, common law rights to 
non-interference with public health and safety.8 
It used to be that problems like heart disease, diabetes, and 
cancer were brought to our attention primarily through public 
service announcements and warnings from our doctors urging us 
to eat better, exercise, stop smoking, and slather on sunscreen. 
These messages sought to bring home the dire consequences that 
would result from our unhealthy choices. But the more subtle 
message was that these problems were a matter of our choices, a 
matter of private concern and personal responsibility. That 
message is changing. As the government is taking on a greater 
role in paying for costly medical treatment, the public’s interest 
in preventing disease and injury is increasing.9 At the same time, 
public health research is revealing the important role played by 
social, economic, and environmental factors in constraining 
people’s behavior choices and determining health outcomes.10 
                                                                                                     
com/files/rjr-v-fda-op.pdf. 
 6. See infra Part III.B. 
 7. See Alexander Lemann, Sheep in Wolves’ Clothing: Removing Parens 
Patriae Suits Under the Class Action Fairness Act, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 122 
(2011) 
The doctrine of parens patriae gives a state standing to sue on behalf 
of its citizens. Although it derives from the “royal prerogative” 
granted to the King of England to sue on behalf of “helpless” subjects 
like children and the mentally incompetent, parens patriae has been 
expanded in the twentieth century by a series of Supreme Court 
decisions, and has been an increasingly popular vehicle for state 
attorneys general to vindicate the rights of their constituents. 
 8. See infra Part III.A. 
 9. This connection is readily apparent in the provisions of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act that address public health. See Thaddeus 
Mason Pope, The Slow Transition of U.S. Law Toward a Greater Emphasis on 
Prevention, in PREVENTION VS. TREATMENT: PHILOSOPHICAL, EMPIRICAL AND 
CULTURAL REFLECTIONS (Halley S. Faust & Paul T. Menzel eds., forthcoming 
2011) (manuscript at 13–15), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=1734405 (describing the main provisions of the PPACA 
relevant to public health) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 10. See infra Part II.A. 
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Influenced by the “new public health” movement,11 public health 
law scholars have begun to redefine their relevance to the science 
and practice of public health—as well as to the broader law and 
policy community—by seeking to use law as a tool to protect and 
promote the public’s health.12 The result is an emerging debate 
over the legitimate scope of the government’s role in ensuring 
access not just to health care, but to healthy lifestyles and living 
conditions as well. Increasingly, health threats such as diabetes 
and heart disease are not simply viewed as personal failures to be 
addressed through clinical prevention and treatment. In the new 
era, they are seen as public problems amenable to structural 
solutions.  
The law and policy strategies of new public health are 
generating controversy on multiple levels. In the blogosphere, 
media pundits are serving up scathing condemnations of what 
they view as overreaching public health interventions.13 In the 
                                                                                                     
 11. The “new public health” label has been used by public health scientists, 
ethicists, and legal scholars. See, e.g., THEODORE H. TULCHINSKY & ELENA A. 
VARAVIKOVA, THE NEW PUBLIC HEALTH (2d ed. 2009); Awofeso, infra note 26; 
NEW ETHICS FOR THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH (Dan E. Beauchamp & Bonnie Steinbock, 
eds., 1999); Wendy E. Parmet & Richard Daynard, The New Public Health 
Litigation, 21 ANN. REV. OF PUB. HEALTH 437 (2000); Richard A. Epstein, Let the 
Shoemaker Stick to His Last: In Defense of the “Old” Public Health, 46 PERSP. 
BIOLOGY & MED. S138 (2003) (critiquing “new public health”). 
 12. See LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, 
RESTRAINT 29 (2d ed. 2008) (offering “a taxonomy of legal tools available to 
government and private citizens to advance the public’s health: taxation and 
spending, alteration of the informational environment, alteration of the built 
environment, alteration of the socioeconomic environment, direct regulation, 
indirect regulation through the tort system, and deregulation”); Scott Burris, 
From Health Care Law to the Social Determinants of Health: A Public Health 
Law Research Perspective, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1651–52 (2011) (describing 
the role of public health law research in “identifying and ameliorating social 
causes of the country’s relatively poor level and distribution of health”). 
 13. See generally William Saletan, Then They Came for the Fresca: The 
Growing Ambitions of the Food Police, SLATE (Sept. 22, 2009), http://www.slate. 
com/id/2229194/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2012) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review); Greg Beato, The Vanity Tax: The Trouble with the 
Government’s New Tax on Indoor Tanning Services, REASON FOUND (June 17, 
2010), http://reason.org/news/show/vanity-tax-tanning (last visited Jan. 28, 
2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Mario Rizzo, The 
Attack on Dignity and Moral Autonomy: The Case of Cigarettes, THINKMARKETS 
(June 26, 2011), http://thinkmarkets.wordpress.com/2011/06/26/the-attack-on-
dignity-and-moral-autonomy-the-case-of-cigarettes/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2012) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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academic literature, a handful of scholars have put forward a 
critique of the rapidly expanding scope of public health as a field 
of science, practice, and law.14 And in the courts, litigants are 
arguing about which health and safety concerns are legitimately 
viewed as public in nature, such that doctrines privileging the 
role of the state should be brought into play.15 
This Article contributes to an emerging theoretical debate 
over the legitimate scope of public health law by linking it to a 
particular doctrinal debate that has arisen in the context of 
public nuisance litigation brought by state and local governments 
against industries that allegedly interfere with the public’s 
health. Both debates focus on the meaning of the “public” as a 
justification for government intervention. In public health law, 
the theoretical dispute is over what makes any particular health 
threat sufficiently public in nature to come within the realm of 
public health. Critics of the new public health movement have 
argued that the politics and law of public health should be 
disconnected from the science of new public health as a means of 
safeguarding individual liberty.16 In public nuisance law, the 
doctrinal dispute is over the meaning of “public rights” (including 
collectively held, common law rights to public health and public 
safety), interference with which is a key element of the public 
nuisance cause of action. In both disputes, the stakes are high. If 
a concern is designated as a public health threat, legal doctrines 
that privilege state intervention over private interests come into 
play. If a state or city government bringing suit in parens patriae 
successfully establishes interference with a public right, the door 
is opened to flexible doctrines of causation and fault that make 
liability more likely. In both debates, critics of a broad definition 
of the public insist that it must be more than the mere 
aggregation of private interests. In theorizing a narrower 
conception of the public, some have attempted to define this 
“something more” in terms of public and private physical spaces. 
                                                                                                     
 14. See infra Part II.B. 
 15. See infra Part III.C. 
 16. A public nuisance is generally defined as a substantial and 
unreasonable interference with a right held in common by the general public.  
See infra Part III.A. But there is considerable disagreement over what kinds of 
interests properly fall within the realm of public rights. See infra Part III.C. 
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Others have defined it in economic terms by linking public health 
and public rights to the securing of public goods.  
This Article stakes out a middle position that adopts the 
classically liberal view of public health law critics—that state 
interference with individual liberty requires robust justification—
while also defining the public broadly so as to justify considerable 
state intervention under the banner of public health. I agree with 
the initial premise of the critics that the public must be defined in 
terms of something more than the mere aggregation of private 
interests. But as a defender for the new public health movement, 
I argue that neither of the narrower conceptions offered by 
critics—the public physical spaces approach, nor the public goods 
approach—adequately accounts for the appropriate scope of the 
state’s authority and responsibility for public health. Drawing on 
my analysis of public nuisance litigation as a public health tool, I 
propose an alternative approach to theorizing the particularly 
public nature of public health threats. I suggest that the concept 
of public bads has been underutilized in justifying state 
intervention to promote public health. I also argue that the 
economic understanding of public bads—as negative externalities 
inflicted on the public without consent—might be supplemented 
by an epidemiological understanding. Epidemiological harms—
which I define as those for which causation can be established at 
the population level, but not necessarily at the individual level—
should be understood as public bads. This concept has the 
potential to provide a more robust understanding of the public 
that may be invoked in justification of public health 
interventions. Rather than advocating for a division between the 
science and politics of public health as a means of protecting 
individual liberty, my proposal seeks to root the new public 
health law movement even more firmly in the science of social 
epidemiology as a means of incorporating the communitarian 
vision of public health within a legal tradition that is still 
fundamentally liberal. 
In Part II, I describe the evolution of public health law in 
response to changing models of public health science and practice. 
I also describe the emerging liberal critique of the now dominant 
ecological model of public health—which emphasizes the role of 
social and environmental interventions to promote health—and 
the resulting theoretical debate over the new public health law 
214 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 207 (2012) 
movement. In Part III, I shift my attention to the use of public 
nuisance litigation as a tool of the new public health law 
movement. I provide a brief discussion of the historical 
development and doctrine of public nuisance law with emphasis 
on its recent use against the asbestos, tobacco, lead paint, and 
firearm industries. I then introduce the doctrinal debate over the 
proper scope of the collectively held common law rights that are 
vindicated through public nuisance suits. In Part IV, I link these 
two debates, analyzing the narrow notion of the public put 
forward by critics in both contexts. In Part V, I propose that 
protection of the public from public bads—understood in 
epidemiological, rather than merely economic, terms—should 
supplement securing of “public goods” as a justification for public 
health interventions and public nuisance liability. 
II. Public Health Law 
Public health focuses on health at a population, rather than 
individual, level. Its core science is epidemiology,17 and its core 
mission is explicitly progressive. Rather than being concerned 
with the treatment of medical conditions on a case-by-case basis, 
public health examines trends in health, illness, and injury in an 
effort to understand their causes and develop interventions to 
address them.18 In broad terms, public health has been described 
as “what we, as a society, do collectively to assure the conditions 
                                                                                                     
 17. Even the definition of epidemiology as a discipline has experienced 
evolution. See LEON GORDIS, EPIDEMIOLOGY 3 (3d ed. 2004)  
Epidemiology is the study of how disease is distributed in populations 
and the factors that influence or determine this distribution. . . . A 
broader definition . . . has been widely accepted. It defines 
epidemiology as “the study of the distribution and determinants of 
health-related states or events in specified populations and the 
application of this study to control of health problems.” What is 
noteworthy about this definition is that it includes both a description 
of the content of the discipline and the purpose or application for 
which epidemiologic investigations are carried out. 
 18. See Geoffrey Rose, Sick Individuals and Sick Populations, in PUBLIC 
HEALTH ETHICS: THEORY, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 33 (Ronald Bayer et al. eds., 
2007) (distinguishing between the individual-centered etiology used in clinical 
medicine–which “seeks the causes of cases”–and the population-focused etiology 
used in public health–which “seeks the causes of incidence”).  
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for people to be healthy.”19 The notion of the “common good” is 
fundamental to this enterprise: 
The health of the public is [a] shared value. Not only 
does each individual have an interest in staying healthy 
but also all of us together share an interest in having a 
healthy population. . . . [W]e may disagree about the best 
ways to promote the public’s health and how to weigh 
individual liberty against the welfare of the whole. 
Nevertheless, reducing disease, saving lives, and 
promoting good health are shared values, part of the 
common good.20 
Despite wide acceptance of the value of public health, 
interventions to protect it frequently generate political 
controversy, particularly when they make use of state 
authority.21 Public health law lives in the thick of this 
controversy: it defines the scope of the state’s authority and 
obligation to protect and promote the public’s health. 
A. The Evolution of Public Health Law 
Public health law is experiencing a massive transformation.22 
For much of the twentieth century, it was defined primarily as 
                                                                                                     
 19. COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF THE FUTURE OF PUB. HEALTH, INST. OF MED., 
THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 19 (1988) [hereinafter FUTURE OF PUBLIC 
HEALTH]. 
 20. Introduction: Ethical Theory and Public Health, in PUBLIC HEALTH 
ETHICS: THEORY, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 20 (Ronald Bayer et al. eds., 2007); see 
also GOSTIN, supra note 12, at 21 (“Social justice is viewed as so central to the 
mission of public health that it has been described as the field’s core value.”). 
 21. See GOSTIN, supra note 12, at 39 (“[T]he dispute [over public health] is 
highly political, with conservative scholars urging limited state action and 
progressive scholars urging far-reaching politics.”).  
 22. See, e.g., id. at xxi–xxii (noting that “scholarly attention to the field of 
public health law has surged”); WENDY E. PARMET, POPULATIONS, PUBLIC 
HEALTH, AND THE LAW 272 (2009) (describing the “reemergence of public health 
law”); Pope, supra note 9, at 34 (describing the “revitalization” of public health 
law “after a nearly fifty-year slumber”); Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Public 
Health Law for a Brave New World, 9 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 181, 182 
(2009) (describing the “burgeoning” of public health law); Benjamin Mason 
Meier, James G. Hodge, Jr. & Kristie M. Gebbie, Transitions in State Public 
Health Law: Comparative Analysis of State Public Health Law Reform 
Following the Turning Point Model Statute, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 423, 424–29 
(2009) (documenting the “modernization” of state public health law). 
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the law of communicable disease control.23 Compulsory 
vaccination and treatment, isolation and quarantine, and 
surveillance of health data were its main subjects. Critics have 
argued that this “old” public health law of communicable disease 
control represents the legitimate scope of the field.24 They take 
issue with public health law’s new focus on chronic disease as 
well as acute communicable disease outbreaks. They are 
particularly wary of the influence of social epidemiology—which 
has exposed the crucial role of social, economic, and 
environmental factors in determining health outcomes25—on the 
new public health law movement.  
Critics have vastly oversimplified the contrast between the 
“old” public health law and the “new.” The development of public 
health law has always been influenced by expanding models of 
public health science and practice. Scholars have identified four 
basic eras in the history of public health, each with an 
accompanying paradigm for understanding the determinants of 
health: the miasma model, the agent model, the behavioral 
model, and the ecological model.26 Each model represents a 
                                                                                                     
 23. See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin, Scott Burris & Zita Lazzarini, The Law 
and the Public’s Health: A Study of Infectious Disease Law in the United States, 
99 COLUM. L. REV. 59, 62 (1999) (“[W]e focus on communicable disease law, both 
because of what it has meant to public health and because of its likely 
importance in the future.”).  
 24. See infra Part II.B. 
 25. See generally LISA F. BERKMAN & ICHIRO KAWACHI, SOCIAL 
EPIDEMIOLOGY (2000); JULIE G. CWIKEL, SOCIAL EPIDEMIOLOGY: STRATEGIES FOR 
PUBLIC HEALTH ACTIVISM (2006). For a critical discussion of the emergence of 
social epidemiology as a distinct field, see generally Gerhard A. Zielhuis & 
Lambertus A.L.M. Kiemeney, Social Epidemiology? No Way, 30 INT’L J. 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 43 (2001). 
 26. My admittedly oversimplified typology draws heavily from two sources. 
In an influential 1996 article in the American Journal of Public Health, Mervyn 
Susser and Ezra Susser described three eras in epidemiology, each with its own 
dominant paradigm: “(1) the era of sanitary statistics with its paradigm 
miasma; (2) the era of infectious disease epidemiology with its paradigm the 
germ theory; and (3) the era of chronic disease epidemiology with its paradigm 
the black box.” Mervyn Susser & Ezra Susser, Choosing a Future for 
Epidemiology: I. Eras and Paradigms, 86 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 668, 668–69 
(1996). They also suggested that a new paradigm, which they did not label, was 
on the horizon. Id.; see also Niyi Awofeso, What’s New About the “New Public 
Health”, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 705 (2004) (presenting the history of public 
health eras); P. Hanlon et al., Making the Case for a ‘Fifth Wave’ in Public 
Health, 125 PUBLIC HEALTH 30 (2011); Elizabeth Fee, The Origins and 
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particular approach to combating disease and promoting health. 
The relevance of law and policy tools to the project of public 
health has varied from model to model, as has the type of 
controversy generated by their use.  
In early nineteenth-century Western Europe and the United 
States, Sanitarians subscribing to the “miasma” model studied 
and sought to improve the physical environment in urban slums 
as a means of fighting disease.27 They attributed disease to 
“poisoning by foul emanations from the soil, water, and 
environing air.”28 They “studied a wide range of industries and 
occupations; detected many hazards from dusts, heavy metals, 
and general working conditions; and conducted national surveys 
of diet, parasite-infested meat, and food contamination.”29 They 
                                                                                                     
Development of Public Health in the United States, in 1 OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF 
PUBLIC HEALTH: THE SCOPE OF PUBLIC HEALTH (Roger Detels et al., ed.) (3d ed. 
1997), reprinted in LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS: A 
READER 27 (1st ed. 2002). In their seminal article on the revival of public health 
law, Lawrence Gostin, Scott Burris, and Zita Lazzarini pointed to three 
conceptual models of public health: “microbial,” “behavioral,” and “ecological.” 
Gostin et al., supra note 23, at 69–70. The typologies offered by Gostin, et al. 
and Susser and Susser are admittedly oversimplified, as is my own. I have 
followed Susser and Susser in attributing each model to a particular historical 
era. The “evolution” story provides a useful way of understanding the 
development of public health law, but it does belie considerable overlap among 
the three models during any given time frame. See Roger Magnusson, Mapping 
the Scope and Opportunities for Public Health Law in Liberal Democracies, 35 
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 571, 574 (2007) (“The 20th century reflects a gradual 
broadening of the determinants that are understood to contribute to states of 
health and illness in the population, and a growing realization of their 
complexity and inter-relationship. This historical shift has important 
implications for public health law.”). I have re-labeled the “microbial” model 
described by Gostin, et al. as the “agent” model to reflect its applicability to non-
infectious diseases. For example, applied to the problem of heart disease, the 
agent model might emphasize cholesterol as the agent and point toward the use 
of cholesterol lowering drugs. Upon a close reading fifteen years after its 
original publication, Susser and Susser’s “black box” paradigm—which “related 
exposure to outcome” with less attention to pathogenesis—and their description 
of a new era on the horizon each appear to combine aspects of the behavioral 
model with an early version of the ecological model. See Susser & Susser, supra, 
at 671 (describing the black box paradigm as being associated with a “web of 
causation” and noting that “the failure to control the disease resides in our lack 
of understanding of transmission and illness in the social context”). 
 27. See generally GEORGE ROSEN, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC HEALTH 1, 220–26 
(expanded ed. 1993). 
 28. Susser & Susser, supra note 26, at 669.  
 29. Id. 
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championed public expenditures on “[c]losed drainage and sewage 
systems, supplemented by garbage collection, public baths, and 
housing [as] remedies that would disperse miasma, reduce 
mortality and morbidity (as indeed they did), and dispel the 
poverty of the new urban poor (as indeed they did not).”30 They 
also advocated for comprehensive legislation to establish state 
and local health authorities and to regulate commercial activities 
harmful to the public’s health.31 In the United States, The 
Slaughterhouse Cases32 arose out of this effort. The U.S. Supreme 
Court upheld the efforts of the City of New Orleans to bring 
slaughterhouse operations under control and, thus, protect 
citizens from cholera outbreaks.33 In doing so, the Court affirmed 
the preeminence of the state’s police power34 to protect “the 
security of the social order, the life and health of the citizen, the 
comfort of an existence in a thickly populated community, the 
enjoyment of private and social life, and the beneficial use of 
property.”35 
Around the turn of the twentieth century, scientists 
conclusively determined that diseases were attributable to 
specific causes rather than to general environmental miasmas.36 
The gradual identification of the bacteria, viruses, and toxins 
responsible for illness made effective vaccination and medical 
treatment possible.37 It also resulted in a major shift toward the 
“agent” model of public health.38 Unlike the Sanitarians’ 
                                                                                                     
 30. Id.  
 31. See WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 168–269 (1996); ROSEN, supra note 27, at 168–
269. 
 32. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873) (consolidating three similar 
cases). 
 33. The reading of the Fourteenth Amendment put forth in the 
Slaughterhouse Cases has generated harsh criticism, but scholars have 
rehabilitated the public health rationale behind the slaughterhouse regulation 
in recent years. See generally RONALD M. LABBÉ & JONATHAN LURIE, THE 
SLAUGHTERHOUSE CASES: REGULATION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT (2003). 
 34. Lawrence O. Gostin, Jacobson v. Massachusetts at 100 Years: Police 
Power and Civil Liberties in Tension, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 576, 577 (2005). 
 35. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. at 62.  
 36. See TULCHINSKY & VARAVIKOVA, supra note 11, at 14. 
 37. See id. 
 38. See Susser & Susser, supra note 26, at 670 (describing germ theory as 
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environmentally focused interventions, the interventions 
associated with the agent model were applied to individuals. “The 
appropriate responses were to limit transmission by vaccines, to 
isolate those affected, and, ultimately, to cure with chemotherapy 
and antibiotics.”39 But vaccination and treatment can only 
eradicate an infectious disease if a high percentage of the 
population is immunized, which creates community, or “herd,” 
immunity.40 The risks of immunization, perhaps amplified by 
mistrust, led some to resist. Legislators thus adopted compulsory 
measures to ensure adequate uptake. This period yielded 
Jacobson v. Massachusetts,41 in which the U.S. Supreme Court 
upheld compulsory vaccination for smallpox.42 Relying on the 
“social compact [whereby] . . . the whole people covenants with 
each citizen and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall 
be governed by certain laws for ‘the common good,’”43 the Court 
made clear that public health measures occupied a special place 
in American law.44 
In the second half of the twentieth century, as chronic, non-
infectious diseases overtook communicable diseases as the 
leading causes of death in wealthy countries,45 the public health 
                                                                                                     
focusing on “single agents relating one to one to specific diseases”). 
 39. Id. 
 40. See Nat’l Inst. of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, Community 
Immunity (“Herd Immunity”) (Oct. 21, 2010), http://www.niaid.nih.gov/ 
topics/pages/communityimmunity.aspx (last visited Jan. 28, 2012) (“When a 
critical portion of a community is immunized against a contagious disease, most 
members of the community are protected against that disease because there is 
little opportunity for an outbreak. Even those who are not eligible for certain 
vaccines get some protection because the spread of contagious disease is 
contained.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Of course, this 
is also the reason that herd immunity presents a potential free rider problem 
whereby a few who go unvaccinated by choice are able to benefit from the risks 
borne by those who opt for vaccination. See Gil Siegal et al., Policy, Politics, and 
Collective Action: An Account of Collective Actions in Public Health, 99 AM. J. 
PUB. HEALTH 1583, 1583 (2009). 
 41. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
 42. Id. at 49. 
 43. Id. at 27. 
 44. See GOSTIN, supra note 12, at 123 (“The Jacobson Court’s use of social 
compact theory to support this expansive understanding of police power was 
unmistakable.”). 
 45. See, e.g., J.P. Machenbach, The Epidemiological Transition Theory, 48 
J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 329, 329 (1994) (“It is the transition 
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model shifted once again toward the “behavioral” model.46 
Initially at least, the medical etiology of these diseases was poorly 
understood, making the agent model inapposite.47 Eventually, 
problems like ischemic heart disease, certain cancers, and type-
two diabetes were associated with behaviors like poor eating and 
exercise habits, tobacco consumption, and excessive sun 
exposure.48 Later, HIV/AIDS was similarly associated with 
unprotected sexual intercourse and intravenous drug use.49 
Based on these observations, the behavioral model of public 
health advocated individual behavior change as a preventive 
approach.50 Informing people of the risks associated with 
smoking, lack of exercise, or risky sexual behavior was seen 
primarily as a task for physicians counseling individual 
                                                                                                     
from a cause of death pattern dominated by infectious diseases with very high 
mortality, especially at younger ages, to a pattern dominated by chronic 
diseases and injuries with lower mortality, mostly peaking at older ages, that is 
seen to be responsible for the tremendous increase in life expectancy.”); Susser 
& Susser, supra note 26, at 670 (“Shortly after [World War II] ended, it was 
clear that, in the developed world, rising chronic disease mortality had 
overtaken mortality from infectious disease.”). 
 46. See Susser & Susser, supra note 26, at 670 (“With the emerging 
predominance of chronic disease of unknown cause, under any credible causal 
paradigm the social and physical environment had now to be reckoned with once 
more.”).  
 47. See id. (“Epidemiologists were faced once more, as in the Sanitary Era, 
with major mortal diseases of completely unknown origin.”).  
 48. See Ali H. Mokdad et al., Actual Causes of Death in the United States, 
2000, 291 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1238, 1239–42 (2004) (contrasting clinical causes of 
death with the “real” cause of disease, including tobacco, poor diet and physical 
inactivity, etc.).  
 49.  In response to the association of HIV/AIDS with particular behaviors 
(some of which are criminalized), advocates have emphasized the role of civil 
and political rights in promoting population health. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Mann 
et al., Health and Human Rights, 1 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 6, 19–22 (1999). More 
recently, public health law scholars have examined the role of law itself as a 
social determinant of health. They have noted that the criminalization of drug 
use, sex work, and certain sexual behaviors has created an environment that is 
not conducive to an effective public health response to HIV/AIDS. See, e.g., Scott 
Burris et al., Racial Disparities in Injection-Related HIV: A Case Study of Toxic 
Law, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 1263, 1267 (2010). 
 50. See Susser & Susser, supra note 26, at 670 (“Once the major infectious 
agents seemed all to have been identified and communicable disease no longer 
overwhelmed all other mortal disorders, the force of the germ theory paradigm 
faded.”). 
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patients.51 It was a project to which the law (initially at least) had 
little relevance.52 At a time when behavioral interventions 
dominated public health’s approach to so-called “lifestyle” 
diseases, public health law became a considerably less important 
part of the American legal landscape.53 Its primary statutes were 
left unrevised and largely unused for decades.54 
Stymied in their efforts to convince people to change their 
behaviors, advocates and researchers began to investigate the 
ways in which external factors constrained people’s behavior 
choices and health outcomes.55 In the late twentieth century, 
their model of public health expanded yet again to encompass not 
only the properties of the agent of disease or injury, and not only 
                                                                                                     
 51. See, e.g., U.S. PREVENTIVE SERV. TASK FORCE, GUIDE TO CLINICAL 
PREVENTATIVE SERVICES: REPORT OF THE U.S. PREVENTATIVE SERV. TASK FORCE 
LXXV (Carolyn DiGuiseppi et al. eds., 2d ed. 1996) (noting that prevention of 
conditions created by unhealthy behavior choices “requires active participation 
by the patient with guidance and support from the clinician”).  
 52. A notable exception during this era was found in the area of injury 
prevention. See Susser & Susser, supra note 26, at 649. Seatbelt and helmet use 
were mandated by law in a growing number of jurisdictions, despite arguments 
that the behavior of going without these protections was primarily self-
regarding and thus restriction of liberty was not warranted. Id. at 649–50; 
Gostin et al., supra note 23, at 73. Challenges to seatbelt and helmet laws were 
upheld, however, on paternalistic grounds as well as on the basis of the negative 
externalities imposed by risk-takers on society. Id. at 64. Bans on smoking, 
particularly in confined public spaces such as airplanes and restaurants, also 
began to take hold. Thaddeus Mason Pope, Balancing Public Health Against 
Individual Liberty: The Ethics of Smoking Regulations, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 419, 
441 (2000). These were justified (via the harm principle) by the nuisance and 
health harms attributable to secondhand smoke. Id. at 442. 
 53. See Magnusson, supra note 26, at 574 (noting that “public health went 
into decline in the post-war period; public health practitioners became role-
bound as managers of state-provided clinical services, while research money 
followed the biomedical model”). 
 54. See FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 19, at 10 (calling on states to 
review their public health statutes and make revisions necessary to, inter alia, 
“support a set of modern disease control measures that address contemporary 
health problems such as AIDS, cancer, and heart disease”). 
 55. See Susser & Susser, supra note 26, at 670 (“With the emerging 
predominance of chronic disease of unknown cause, under any credible causal 
paradigm the social and physical environment had now to be reckoned with once 
more.”); id. at 671 (“We know which social behaviors need to change, but we 
know little about how to change them, even when entire societies are at stake.”); 
Michael G. Marmot, Understanding Social Inequalities in Health, 46 PERSP. 
BIOLOGY & MED. S9, S15–S16 (Supp. 2003) (comprehensively describing the 
social determinants of health). 
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the behaviors of the individual, but also the social, economic, and 
physical environment in which the agent and individual 
interact.56 The development of the now-dominant “ecological” 
model of health has been heavily influenced by social 
epidemiology, which demonstrates that socially, culturally, and 
materially disadvantaged people live shorter, less healthy lives.57 
This association persists across nearly every type and degree of 
disadvantage that one can imagine. It seems to be firmly 
entrenched even in places with universal health care, suggesting 
that differential access to healthy living conditions and lifestyles 
plays a greater role in determining health disparities than 
differential access to medical care.58 
The ecological model places supposedly private, individual 
choices into their social context and emphasizes structural 
explanations for health behaviors and outcomes. In this view, 
eating a diet high in calories and fat and low in nutrients is not 
merely a matter of personal choice. It is a behavior that is 
influenced by environmental factors: an information environment 
that is loaded with commercial marketing59 and a food 
                                                                                                     
 56. See TULCHINSKY & VARAVIKOVA, supra note 11, at xxiv (“The New Public 
Health incorporates a wide range of interventions in the physical and social 
environment, health behavior, and biomedical methods, along with health care 
organization and financing.”); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., HEALTHY 
PEOPLE 2010: UNDERSTANDING AND IMPROVING HEALTH 18 (2d ed. 2000) 
(“Individual biology and behaviors influence health through their interaction 
with each other and with the individual’s social and physical environments. In 
addition, policies and interventions can improve health by targeting factors 
related to individuals and their environments, including access to quality health 
care.”); Magnusson, supra note 26, at 572 (“The modern paradigm for 
understanding the determinants of health and illness (both communicable and 
non-communicable) calls attention to a cascading set of influences. These range 
from ‘upstream’ social, economic, and environmental factors all the way down to 
individual behaviors, clinical interventions, and genetics.”). 
 57. See Marmot, supra note 55, at S16 (noting that not just money, but also 
culture and other factors lead to a “short life expectancy”). 
 58. See id. (noting that “we need to go beyond absolute measures of income 
to understand the relationship between social position and health”); WORLD 
HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO), COMMISSION ON THE SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF 
HEALTH, Closing the Gap in a Generation: Health Equity Through Action on the 
Social Determinants of Health (2008), available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/ 
publications/2008/9789241563703_eng.pdf (explaining how daily living 
conditions, including the effect of power, money, and resources affects health). 
 59. See, e.g., ELIZABETH S. MOORE, IT’S CHILD’S PLAY: ADVERGAMING AND THE 
ONLINE MARKETING OF FOOD TO CHILDREN—REPORT (2006), available at 
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environment saturated with unhealthy options that are cheaper 
and more readily accessible than healthy choices.60 Not getting 
enough physical exercise is not simply a personal failure, it is a 
behavior influenced by a built environment that discourages 
walking for transportation and provides few opportunities for 
active entertainment.61 In turn, the information, food, and built 
environments that one lives and works within are dependent 
upon underlying social and economic factors. Poor neighborhoods 
have more fast food establishments and fewer full-service grocery 
stores than middle-income neighborhoods.62 Children from low-
                                                                                                     
http://www.kff.org/entmedia/upload/7536.pdf; CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. 
INTEREST, PESTERING PARENTS: HOW FOOD COMPANIES MARKET OBESITY TO 
CHILDREN (2003), available at http://www.cspinet.org/new/pdf/pages_from_ 
pestering_parents_final_pt_1.pdf (explaining that food companies advertise to 
children through the television and through the internet); CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE 
PUB. INTEREST, PESTERING PARENTS: HOW FOOD COMPANIES MARKET OBESITY TO 
CHILDREN (2003), available at http://www.cspinet.org/new/pdf/pages_from_ 
pestering_parents_final_pt_1.pdf (noting that it is difficult for parents to 
compete with the advertisements on television, in magazines, at school, and 
other sources that affect what their children want to eat); David Ashton, Food 
Advertising and Childhood Obesity, 97 J. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 51, 51 (2004) 
(“[A]dvertising to children does have an adverse effect on food preferences, 
purchasing behaviour and consumption.”). 
 60. See, e.g., Paul Diller & Samantha Graff, Regulating Food Retail for 
Obesity Prevention: How Far Can Cities Go?, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 89, 89 
(2011) (“Regulating retail food establishments can be a powerful tool for 
improving a community’s food environment, especially in low-income ‘food 
desserts’—areas that lack full-service supermarkets and restaurants and are 
saturated with fast-food restaurants and liquor stores.”); Adam Drewnowski, 
Obesity and the Food Environment: Dietary Energy Density and Diet Costs, 27 
AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 154, 154 (2004) (explaining that foods that are higher 
in calories and fat saturated foods tend to be cheaper).  
 61. See, e.g., Wendy C. Perdue, Obesity, Poverty, and the Built 
Environment: Challenges and Opportunity, 15 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 
821, 825 (2008) (“Access to healthy food, sidewalks and land use patterns that 
facilitate walking, and ample recreation facilities are all environmental 
characteristics that impact obesity-causing behaviors.”); Montrece McNeil 
Ransom et al., Pursuing Health Equity: Zoning Codes and Public Health, 39 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 94, 95 (2011) (“[C]ommunity design intricacies and urban 
planning processes can lead to environments that either reduce or exacerbate 
health inequities.”).  
 62. See, e.g., Neissa Smith, Eatin’ Good? Not in This Neighborhood: A Legal 
Analysis of Disparities in Food Availability and Quality at Chain Supermarkets 
in Poverty-Stricken Areas, 14 MICH. J. RACE & L. 197, 197 (2009) (“One reason 
for this struggle is the tendency of chain supermarkets to provide a limited 
selection of goods and a lower quality of goods to patrons in less affluent 
neighborhoods.”). 
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income families are more likely to live in communities where 
public parks and playgrounds are in disrepair and where the 
threat of violence keeps people indoors.63 These are only a few of 
the factors that determine supposedly personal choices, and 
obesity is only one of the many health outcomes in which a social 
gradient is in evidence. Public health science is demonstrating 
that “[t]he poor sicken more than the rich not simply because 
they encounter more microbes or engage in less healthy 
behavior—their exposure and their behavior have social roots.”64 
The question is whether the politics of public health will keep up 
with the science.65  
The ecological model of health has opened up expansive new 
frontiers for public health law.66 As public health scientists and 
practitioners began to explore options for altering our 
environments in ways that promote population health, they found 
that they once again had a need for lawyers and policymakers. 
Public health law began to evolve from the law of communicable 
disease control towards a much broader discipline defined by 
Gostin in 2000 as: 
the study of the legal powers and duties of the state to 
assure the conditions for people to be healthy (e.g., to 
identify, prevent, and ameliorate risks to health in the 
population) and the limitations on the power of the state 
to constrain the autonomy, privacy, liberty, proprietary, 
                                                                                                     
 63. See, e.g., Gary Bennet et al., Safe to Walk?: Neighborhood Safety and 
Physical Activity Among Public Housing Residents, 4 PLOS MED. 1599, 1605 
(2007) (“Our data provide preliminary, albeit cross-sectional, evidence that 
perceived neighborhood safety may serve as a barrier to physical activity in low-
income settings.”); Dustin Duncan et al., Association Between Neighborhood 
Safety and Overweight Status Among Urban Adolescents, 9 BMC PUBLIC HEALTH 
289, 290 (2009) (“Neighborhood safety may be an important contributor to 
overweight, as it has been theorized that fear of violence and crime in the 
immediate social environment is a barrier to physical activity and a facilitator of 
sedentary behavior (two well-established predictors of overweight).”). 
 64. Gostin et al., supra note 23, at 75. 
 65. See Mark A. Hall, The Scope and Limits of Public Health Law, 46 
PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. S199, S199 (2003) (exploring “the proper scope of public 
health legal authority in response to compelling scientific evidence about the 
social determinants of health”).  
 66. See Magnusson, supra note 26, at 574 (“The recognition that health 
is . . . the product of the interaction of environmental, socioeconomic, behavioral, 
and biological factors, partially modified by medical interventions--opens up a 
variety of possibilities for public health policy.”). 
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or other legally protected interests of individuals for the 
protection or promotion of community health.67 
Gostin’s influential treatise refers to “law as a tool for the public’s 
health” and identifies multiple models for legal intervention that 
range far beyond the body of public health statutes and 
regulatory codes.68 Gostin’s text reflects developments in public 
health practice. Public health advocates are working to develop 
and implement innovative, evidence-based regulatory solutions to 
a wide range of health problems.69 They are also increasingly 
involved in the development of groundbreaking litigation 
strategies.70 
                                                                                                     
 67. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 4 (1st ed. 2000). 
 68. GOSTIN, supra note 12, at 21. 
 69. See, e.g., Michael F. Jacobson & Kelly D. Brownell, Small Taxes on Soft 
Drinks and Snack Foods to Promote Health, 90 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 854, 854 
(2000) (“To compensate for an unhealthy food environment, it has been 
suggested that foods high in calories, fat, or sugar be subjected to special taxes 
and that the cost of healthful foods, such as fruits and vegetables, be 
subsidized.”); Kelly D. Brownell & T.R. Frieden, Ounces of Prevention—the 
Public Policy Case for Taxes on Sugared Beverages, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1805, 
1805 (2009). 
A penny-per-ounce excise tax could reduce consumption of sugared 
beverages by more than 10%. It is difficult to imagine producing 
behavior change of this magnitude through education alone, even if 
government devoted massive resources to the task. In contrast, a 
sales tax on sugared drinks would generate considerable revenue, and 
as with the tax on tobacco, it could become a key tool in efforts to 
improve health. 
T. Giang et al., Closing the Grocery Gap in Underserved Communities: The 
Creation of the Pennsylvania Fresh Food Financing Initiative, 14 J. PUB. HEALTH 
MGMT. & PRAC. 272, 275 (2008) (discussing “[t]he Fresh Food Financing 
Initiative . . . [which] works to meet the financing needs of supermarket 
operators that plan to operate in underserved communities where infrastructure 
costs and credit needs cannot be filled solely by conventional financial 
institutions”); Melissa Neiman, Motorcycle Helmet Laws: The Facts, What Can 
be Done to Jump-start Helmet Use, and Ways to Cap Damages 11 J. HEALTH 
CARE L. & POL’Y 215, 232–35, 238–40, 243–48 (2008) (encouraging courts and 
legislatures to create a duty for motorcyclists to wear helmets); Eric P. Lynch, 
Federal Gun Storage Legislation: Will this Keep Guns Out of the Hands of our 
Children, 16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 211, 230–31 (1999) (analyzing The 
Child Firearm Access Prevention Act, which “insure[s] the safe storage of 
firearms in those states that have not passed such laws”); James Hodge, Jr. & 
Gabriel Eber, Tobacco Control Legislation: Tools for Public Health Improvement, 
32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 516, 520–22 (2004) (arguing for the implementation of 
effective tobacco control policies).  
 70. See Peter Jacobson & Soheil Soliman, Litigation as Public Health 
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B. The Emerging Critique of Public Health Law’s 
Expanding Scope 
Criticism of the new public health law was to some extent 
inevitable. As Roger Magnusson has explained, “[t]he use of law 
as a policy tool to respond comprehensively to environmental 
exposures, unhealthy lifestyles, and accidental injuries threatens 
to impinge on the interests of a wide variety of industries, and to 
significantly expand sites for state intervention.”71 As Lawrence 
Gostin and Gregg Bloche have put it, “The ‘new’ public health has 
raised political conservatives’ ire . . . by extending its reach 
beyond the traditional domain of infectious disease to social and 
economic influences on population-wide health. In doing so it has 
inquired into . . . causal connections between ill-health and such 
powerful institutions as tobacco companies, industrial polluters, 
firearm manufacturers, and fast-food chains.”72 Certainly, the 
critical response to new public health is motivated in part by 
material interests.73 But it also arises out of deep-seated 
philosophical and cultural views about whether the degree of 
government intrusion supported by decisions like Jacobson v. 
Massachusetts is justified when applied to noncommunicable 
disease threats and the social determinants of health. 
On a philosophical level, the debate over new public health 
law arises out of a tension between public health’s 
communitarian foundations and the liberal foundations of 
American law and policy. Thaddeus Pope, a health law scholar 
trained in philosophy, has articulated the tension in terms of core 
values: “[l]iberalism demands that liberty limitation be carefully, 
                                                                                                     
Policy: Theory or Reality?, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 224, 224 (2002) (“In recent 
years, the most ardent proponents of litigation as public policy have been public 
health advocates.”). 
 71. Magnusson, supra note 26, at 572. 
 72. Lawrence O. Gostin & M. Gregg Bloche, The Politics of Public Health: A 
Response to Epstein, 46 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. S160, S172 (2003). 
 73. The industries mentioned by Gostin and Bloche have pumped 
significant funds into mounting public relations campaigns opposing measures 
such as taxes on sugared beverages. See Joey Peters, Soda Taxes Fizzle in Wake 
of Industry Lobbying, MCCLATCHY TRIBUNE, July 13, 2010, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/13/AR20100713 
03494.html (“In every state where a soda-tax plan has been proposed, it’s been 
met with a heavily funded campaign from the beverage lobby to oppose any type 
of increase.”).  
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narrowly, and thoroughly justified. Communitarianism, in 
contrast, holds that individual rights and social responsibilities 
are equivalent, and that liberty and the common good have 
equal standing.”74 The dominant philosophy of American law is 
liberalism—“a language centered on the values of freedom, self-
determination, self-discipline, personal responsibility, and 
limited government.”75 Public health, on the other hand, “is 
fundamentally an effort to promote . . . shared goals” of 
“reducing disease, saving lives, and promoting good health,” and 
is thus “a species of communitarianism.”76 Broadly conceived, 
public health offers a distinctly different “language” for talking 
about “how a society balances considerations of personal 
responsibility and social accountability in public policies that 
impact health.”77 
On a cultural level, the expansion of public health law 
highlights a central tension between the behavioral model, 
which supported a cultural norm of personal responsibility for 
health behaviors, and the ecological model, which problematizes 
that vision and promotes public responsibility for healthy living 
conditions. As Gostin, Burris, and Lazzarini have noted, “seeing 
public health predominantly as the control of risky behavior can 
quickly become, for cultural and political reasons, a warrant for 
treating health entirely as a matter of personal responsibility.”78 
The behavioral model’s notion of health as a matter of personal 
responsibility has been so influential that critics of the new 
public health law have adopted it implicitly. Critics of the 
“revolution” in public health have wrongly posited a shift from 
                                                                                                     
 74. Pope, supra note 9. 
 75. Id.; see also Scott Burris, The Invisibility of Public Health: Population-
Level Measures in a Politics of Market Individualism, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 
1607, 1608 (1997) (“[T]o accept the rhetorical structure of market individualism 
is to accept a political language that has no words for public health.”). 
 76. Introduction: Ethical Theory and Public Health, in FUTURE OF PUBLIC 
HEALTH, supra note 19, at 20. 
 77. Lawrence Wallack & Regina Lawrence, Talking About Public Health: 
Developing America’s “Second Language,” 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 567, 567 
(2005). 
 78. Gostin et al., supra note 23, at 72 (emphasis added); see also PARMET, 
supra note 22, at 111 (“If individuals are assumed to be the masters of their own 
health, and if populations are viewed as mere aggregations of individuals, then 
the health of populations can be seen as a function of individual choices.”). 
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the “old” agent model to the “new” ecological model. Ironically, 
this oversimplified story79 both omits and tacitly adopts the 
behavioral model’s view that law has little relevance to modern 
public health problems. It also ignores the extent to which the 
ecological model represents a return to the basic approach of the 
Sanitarians—who argued that health issues “were societal and 
that the appropriate measures thus had to be applied across 
society.”80 Although the agent model drew resources and 
attention away from the social reform movement of the 
Sanitarians,81 it was the behavioral model that solidified the 
belief that “lifestyle” diseases were a matter of personal 
responsibility beyond the reach of public health law.82 The 
ecological model vindicates this earlier cultural shift by 
associating health outcomes with structural factors that 
constrain individual choices. 
Recently, a handful of legal scholars—including Richard 
Epstein,83 Mark Hall,84 Mark Rothstein,85 and Thaddeus 
                                                                                                     
 79. See William J. Novak, Private Wealth and Public Health: A Critique of 
Richard Epstein’s Defense of the “Old” Public Health, 46 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. 
S176 (2003) (offering an “alternative history of public health regulation in the 
United States” that “emphasizes the close links between public health law and 
the larger history of liberalism, state-building, and American constitutional 
development”). 
 80. See Awofeso, supra note 26, at 705 (“[P]ublic health seems to have come 
full circle.”). Compare Susser & Susser, supra note 26, at 669, with Michael 
Marmot, Social Determinants of Health Inequalities, 365 THE LANCET 1099, 
1103 (2005) (“[I]f the major determinants of health are social, so must be the 
remedies.”). 
 81. See Susser & Susser, supra note 26, at 670 (“[T]he epidemiology of 
populations and environmental exposures, and the social dynamics of disease 
that had followed from the miasma theory went into decline, replaced by a focus 
on control of infectious agents.”). 
 82. See Magnusson, supra note 26, at 577 (“Society looks to the state to act 
decisively in response to risks posed by communicable diseases, contaminated 
food, toxic spills, and other ‘externally caused threats.’ But debate persists 
around the state’s responsibility to respond to risks over which individuals are 
presumed to have control, including obesity, smoking, and chronic disease.”). 
 83. Epstein, supra note 11, at S138; Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the 
“Old” Public Health, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1421 (2004) [hereinafter Epstein, In 
Defense of the “Old” Public Health]; Richard A. Epstein, What (Not) to Do About 
Obesity: A Moderate Aristotelian Answer, 93 GEO. L.J. 1361 (2005). 
 84. Hall, supra note 65, at S202. 
 85. Mark A. Rothstein, Rethinking the Meaning of Public Health, J.L. MED. 
& ETHICS 144 (2002) [hereinafter Rothstein, Rethinking the Meaning of Public 
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Pope86—have articulated coherent and principled criticisms of 
the expanding scope of public health. Although each scholar has 
approached the issue from his own perspective,87 I detect an 
overarching project in their work as a whole. For the purposes of 
                                                                                                     
Health]; Mark A. Rothstein, The Limits of Public Health: A Response, 2 PUB. 
HEALTH ETHICS 84 (2009) [hereinafter Rothstein, The Limits of Public Health]. 
 86. Pope, supra note 9. 
 87. The four critics of new public health law diverge in their reasons for 
being skeptical of its expanding scope. Epstein generally argues against all 
social and economic regulation unless it is rigorously justified in terms of 
market failure. See, e.g., Richard Eptstein, Throttled by Compliance, DEFINING 
IDEAS (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-
ideas/article/69086 (last visited Jan. 28, 2012) (arguing that “feckless 
regulations” will stymie innovation) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). In contrast, Hall and Rothstein have each indicated that they generally 
support the social agenda promoted by social epidemiology, but feel that this 
agenda should not be co-opted by public health. See Hall, supra note 65, at S208 
Beyond the public health arena, there are other good reasons for the 
government to pursue the more general aims of education, taxation, 
regulation, and redistribution, but these are broader social and 
economic policies or they belong to legal realms other than health. 
Public health advocates can be commended for calling our attention 
to the health implications of social disparities, but health promotion 
should not be the primary objective of corrective measures. 
See also Rothstein, The Limits of Public Health, supra note 85, at 86 
(“[C]oncerns about social justice should play a part in priority setting for public 
health. My point is simply that resolution of underlying socioeconomic and 
political problems is beyond the domain of public health.”). Their concerns are 
civil libertarian in nature. See Hall, supra note 65, at S207 (noting that public 
health interventions to improve basic sanitation, living, and working conditions, 
including modern environmental and occupational health regulations are less 
problematic because “these measures affect primarily only property or economic 
interests, not personal liberty”); Rothstein, The Limits of Public Health, supra 
note 85, at 85 
One of the main reasons that I support a narrow definition of public 
health is that public health laws give public health officials a range of 
coercive powers to protect the population. Unless the scope of 
permissible governmental action is carefully circumscribed, there is a 
threat to civil liberties by governmental confiscation of property, 
restraint on the movement of individuals, mandating of medical 
examinations and similar measures. 
Pope’s view is more accommodating. He generally agrees with the agenda of new 
public health law, but feels that this agenda can be justified only in terms of 
hard paternalism and that efforts to justify it on other grounds—for example in 
terms of the aggregate costs that unhealthy lifestyles impose on society—are 
dishonest. For this reason, Pope is perhaps less a subscriber to the liberal 
critique than a describer of it. 
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this Article, I will characterize this project as an emerging 
liberal (in the classical sense) critique of the new public health. 
The liberal critics have argued for a disconnect between 
public health science and practice. Hall and Epstein begin from 
the proposition that regardless of the validity of social 
epidemiology as a scientific matter, it does not necessarily follow 
that state authority to intervene “under the banner of public 
health” should be expanded.88 Epstein draws a distinction 
between “the conception of public health that is internal to the 
public health discipline, and the conception of public health as it 
has been understood outside the public health field by historians 
and lawyers who are interested in defining the appropriate use 
and limitations of the state power of coercion.”89 Similarly, Hall 
stresses the need “to more clearly differentiate between public 
health analysis and public health authority.” He seeks to divide 
public health into two “broad responsibilities: (1) advancing 
understanding and knowledge of the causes and patterns of 
health conditions in society; and (2) eliminating threats to public 
health. The first is the domain of public health as a scientific 
discipline. The second is the domain of public health law.”90 Hall’s 
“central point” is that “public health law is much more limited 
than public health science.”91 
These critics note with considerable wariness that in the 
domain of law, designating a problem as “public” changes the 
rules of the game.92 Epstein has argued that by labeling health 
behaviors like diet, exercise, smoking, and tanning as “public 
health” problems, we trigger legal doctrines that privilege heavy-
handed state intervention over protection of individual rights. 
“[T]he case for government intervention . . . gets that extra boost 
                                                                                                     
 88. Epstein, supra note 11, at S154. 
 89. Id. at S138. 
 90. Hall, supra note 65, at S202. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See Magnusson, supra note 26, at 571 (“Debate about [the] goals and 
definitions [of public health law] reflects competing claims about the boundaries 
for the legitimate exercise of political and administrative power.”); Hall, supra 
note 65, at S202 (“These definitional boundaries [between public health law and 
public health science] matter a great deal because the law operates through 
categories, and classification has huge effects on how legal issues are 
analyzed.”). 
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of legitimacy” when framed as a public health issue.93 Rothstein 
has offered perhaps the most eloquent statement of this position: 
“The broad power of government to protect public health includes 
the authority to supersede individual liberty and property 
interests in the name of preserving the greater public good. It is 
an awesome responsibility, and therefore it cannot and must not 
be used indiscriminately.”94 Ultimately, then, the debate over the 
legitimate scope of public health law is a debate over the meaning 
of the “public” as a justification for state intervention. Are non-
communicable disease threats and the social determinants of 
health properly understood as public health problems? 
III. Public Nuisance Law 
This Article responds to the emerging liberal critique of new 
public health law by linking it to a particular doctrinal debate 
over the proper meaning of the “public” that has arisen in the 
context of public nuisance litigation. Public nuisance law and 
public health law share a common heritage in the police power of 
the state.95 At its core, public nuisance is a tool for addressing 
                                                                                                     
 93. Epstein, In Defense of the “Old” Public Health, supra note 83, at 1424. 
 94. Rothstein, Rethinking the Meaning of Public Health, supra note 85, at 
148–49. 
 95. See Wendy E. Parmet, Legal Rights and Communicable Disease: AIDS, 
the Police Power and Individual Liberty, 14 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 741, 743 
(1989). 
In American jurisprudence the public’s interest in preserving health 
was embodied in the concept of the ‘police power,’ a term that has lost 
much of its early meaning. The concept of the police power appears to 
have its roots in the law of nuisance and the common law principle 
that property rights are limited to the extent that they injure others. 
Thus the public, acting through the state, could regulate the rights of 
real property or contract to protect the public health and safety. More 
importantly, basic rights of property were limited by the needs of the 
public. 
Some have suggested that the public nuisance cause of action, at least when 
brought by state and local government officials suing in parens patriae, is not 
properly understood as a tort at all, but is more closely related to the state’s 
exercise of its police power. See, e.g., Thomas Merrill, Is Public Nuisance a Tort? 
4 J. TORT L. 1 (2011); Karol Boudreaux & Bruce Yandle, Public Bads and Public 
Nuisance: Common Law Remedies for Environmental Decline, 14 FORDHAM 
ENVTL. L.J. 55, 62 (2002) (“In public nuisance cases involving a private plaintiff, 
the action is in tort. These cases are conceptually different from a public 
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public bads. Its central element is an “unreasonable interference 
with a right common to the general public,” including 
“interference with the public health, the public safety, the public 
peace, the public comfort or the public convenience.”96 It is a very 
old cause of action97 that advocates have made new again by 
applying it to some of the most complex public health and 
environmental98 problems of our time: the costs of tobacco use, 
                                                                                                     
nuisance brought by the sovereign, which is more analogous to an exertion of 
the police power of the state, as noted above, rather than tort.”). Like public 
nuisance law, early manifestations of public health law were focused on the 
state’s police power to limit property rights. See Robyn Martin, Domestic 
Regulation of Public Health: England and Wales, in LAW AND THE PUBLIC 
DIMENSION OF HEALTH 75, 79 (Robyn Martin & Linda Johnson eds., 2001) 
(describing longstanding English public health legislation, which “does not have 
as its primary focus the promotion of health, nor does it particularly address the 
causes of ill health. The concern is with inadequate premises, on an 
understanding that ill health results from identifiable bodies escaping from a 
physical source”). 
 96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979). It is worth noting here 
that public nuisance law does not create an affirmative right to public health 
such as would create a governmental obligation of fulfillment. Rather, it 
recognizes a negative right to be free from private interference with the public’s 
health. This non-interference right is, however, intimately connected to the 
governmental obligation to protect the public’s health. 
 97. The modern private nuisance cause of action originated as one of the 
three ancient assizes in twelfth-century England—alongside trespass and 
disseisin—which a private landowner could use to vindicate his property rights. 
The modern public nuisance cause of action has a distinct, but equally venerable 
pedigree. It also originated in twelfth-century England in the doctrine of 
purprestures—whereby the Crown penalized public wrongs as criminal 
infringements on the rights of the sovereign. Early nuisances generally involved 
actions that obstructed public roads or watercourses, or made them hazardous. 
See C.H.S. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW: TORT AND 
CONTRACT 3–5 (1949) (describing the process by which nuisance laws were 
historically enforced); F.H. Newark, The Boundaries of Nuisance, 65 L.Q. REV. 
480, 481 (1949) (tracing the roots of nuisance in the common law). The early 
criminal writ also allowed for “incidental civil relief.” William L. Prosser, Private 
Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997, 997–98 (1966); Eric Kintner, 
Note, Bad Apples and Smoking Barrels: Private Actions for Public Nuisance 
Against the Gun Industry, 90 IOWA L.R. 1163, 1188–89 (2005) (citing Prosser, 
noting that an officer of the Crown could initiate these early nuisance actions). 
 98. See generally JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., CREATIVE COMMON LAW STRATEGIES 
FOR PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT xix (Clifford Rechtschaffen & Denise 
Antolini eds., 2007) (describing “how committed and creative lawyers in the first 
decade of the new century have reengineered the old causes of action to make 
them potent new tools for dealing with some of the gravest and most persistent 
environmental problems we face”). 
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gun violence, the contamination of our housing stock with lead 
paint, and climate change. In a sense, the industry-wide public 
nuisance litigation of the 1990s and 2000s can be viewed as an 
early manifestation of the new public health law movement.99 
While Hall, Epstein, Pope, and Rothstein have focused on what 
happens “When Epidemiologists Become Lawmakers,”100 public 
nuisance litigation to address product-caused harms might be 
understood as what happens “When Epidemiologists Become 
Litigators.” These new applications have regenerated an old 
debate over the legitimate uses of public nuisance law.101 Most 
courts have been anxious to prevent these claims from going 
forward and they have sought to do so by tethering the cause of 
action using a wide range of procedural and substantive 
doctrines. This Article focuses on the substantive dilemma at the 
heart of these cases: can the harm to health and welfare caused 
                                                                                                     
 99. Cf. David Kairys, The Governmental Handgun Cases and the Elements 
and Underlying Policies of Public Nuisance Law, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1175, 1178 
(2000) [hereinafter Kairys, Underlying Policies] (“Public nuisance is the only 
tort designed and equipped to protect the public from activities or conduct that 
is incompatible with public health, safety, or peace.”); DONALD G. GIFFORD, 
SUING THE TOBACCO AND LEAD PIGMENT INDUSTRIES: GOVERNMENT LITIGATION AS 
PUBLIC HEALTH PRESCRIPTION (2010) (identifying public nuisance litigation 
against product manufacturers as a form of public health litigation). 
 100. Hall, supra note 65, at S202. 
 101. Public nuisance has long been ridiculed by courts and commentators as 
a “monster that would devour in one gulp the entire law of tort,” Tioga Public 
Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 984 F.2d 915, 921 (8th Cir. 1993), “the dust bin of 
the law,” Award v. McColgan, 98 N.W.2d 571, 573 (Mich. 1959); Osborne M. 
Reynolds, Jr., Public Nuisance: A Crime in Tort Law, 31 OKLA. L. REV. 318 
(1978), and a collection of the “rag ends of the law.” Newark, supra note 97, at 
482. The same anxiety is palpable in court opinions adjudicating modern public 
nuisance claims against product manufacturers and distributors. See, e.g., 
Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d 
536 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[I]f public nuisance law were permitted to encompass 
product liability, nuisance law ‘would become a monster that would devour in 
one gulp the entire law of tort.’”); In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 494 (N.J. 
2007) (“[T]o permit these complaints to proceed . . . would stretch the concept of 
public nuisance far beyond recognition and would create a new and entirely 
unbounded tort antithetical to the meaning and inherent theoretical limitations 
of the tort of public nuisance.”); People ex rel. Spitzer v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 
Inc., 309 A.D.2d 91, 96 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (“[G]iving a green light to a 
common-law public nuisance cause of action today will . . . likely open the 
courthouse doors to a flood of limitless, similar theories of public 
nuisance . . . against [these defendants and against] a wide and varied array of 
other commercial and manufacturing enterprises and activities.”). 
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by industries that manufacture and distribute dangerous 
products be legitimately understood as interference with a public 
right? 
A. The Doctrine of Public Nuisance 
Public nuisance is perhaps best explained by way of reference 
to its cousin, private nuisance. For example, the owner of a hog 
farm producing noxious odors and other unpleasantness gets 
sued by neighboring property owners who argue that their right 
to enjoy their own property is being infringed upon by the 
defendant’s allegedly unreasonable use of its property. One kind 
of public nuisance claim is a fairly modest extension of this 
private nuisance doctrine. Imagine the hog farm is not just 
affecting its neighbors, but an entire town. At a certain point, this 
property-based private nuisance becomes a public one simply by 
virtue of the large number of people affected.102 But there is also 
another kind of public nuisance claim103 that does not necessarily 
have anything to do with the defendant’s property use or the 
plaintiffs’ property enjoyment.104 It is this broader kind of claim 
that has sparked most of the legal and political controversy over 
nuisance.105 
                                                                                                     
 102. See, e.g., Village of Pine City v. Munch, 44 N.W. 197, 197–98 (Minn. 
1890) (“[A nuisance is public] if it affects the surrounding community generally 
or the people of some local neighborhood.”). 
 103. Michael McBride, Critical Legal History and Private Actions Against 
Public Nuisances, 1800–1865, 22 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 307, 313–14 (1989) 
(describing two distinct types of public nuisance cases before nineteenth-century 
courts—those involving the infringement of public rights and those involving 
aggregations of injuries to private rights in land “so widespread as to be a 
legitimate concern of the state”). 
 104. See City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1142 
(Ohio 2002) (holding that nuisance claims are not limited to real property and 
can be maintained for injuries caused by a product’s design, manufacturing, 
marketing, or sale if the defendant’s conduct interfered with a common right of 
the general public); 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances § 31, at 592 (2002) (“A public 
nuisance, unlike a private nuisance, does not necessarily involve an interference 
with the use and enjoyment of land, or an invasion of another’s interest in the 
private use and enjoyment of land, but encompasses any unreasonable 
interference with a right common to the general public.”).  
 105. Of course, even the more limited doctrine of private nuisance has 
generated its share of controversy. So much so that in the great majority of 
states, our hog farm would be able to proceed with little concern for private or 
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In general, a public nuisance of the broader type is defined as 
a substantial and unreasonable interference with a right common 
to the general public.106 This right is sometimes referred to as a 
right “of the community at large,”107 or a “public right.”108 Section 
                                                                                                     
public nuisance liability of the first kind. In all fifty states, “right to farm” 
statutes provide some degree of immunity from nuisance suits for farming 
operations that meet certain criteria, even where their industrial methods 
impose considerable burdens on the health and welfare of surrounding 
communities. See generally Rusty Rumley, A Comparison of the General 
Provisions Found in Right to Farm Statutes, 12 VT. J. ENVTL L. 327 (2011). 
 106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979). 
 107. Prosser, supra note 97, at 999; see also Ozark Poultry Prods. Inc. v. 
Garman, 472 S.W.2d 714, 716 (Ark. 1971); Fisher v. Zumwalt, 128 Cal. 493, 495-
96 (Cal. 1900) (noting that public nuisance is usually limited to “an invasion of a 
right which is common to every person in the community”) (quoting Fisher v. 
Zumwalt, 61 P. 82 (Cal. 1900)); see also People v. Rubenfeld, 172 N.E. 485, 486 
(N.Y. 1930) (noting that to qualify as a public nuisance, “the number of persons 
affected need not be . . . ‘very great.’ Enough that so many are touched by the 
offense and in ways so indiscriminate and general that the multiplied 
annoyance may not unreasonably be classified as a wrong to the community”).  
 108. See, e.g., Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98, 131–32 (Conn. 
2001)  
Nuisances are public where they violate public rights, and produce a 
common injury, and where they constitute an obstruction to public 
rights, that is, the rights enjoyed by citizens as part of the public. . . . 
If the annoyance is one that is common to the public generally, then it 
is a public nuisance. . . . The test is not the number of persons 
annoyed, but the possibility of annoyance to the public by the 
invasion of its rights. 
City of Phoenix v. Johnson, 75 P.2d 30, 34 (Ariz. 1938) 
A nuisance is common or public when it affects the rights which are 
enjoyed by its citizens as a part of the public, while a private nuisance 
is one which affects a single individual or a definite number of 
persons in the enjoyment of some private right which is not common 
to the public . . . The distinction does not arise from any necessary 
difference in the nature or the character of the thing which creates a 
nuisance, but is based on the difference between the rights affected 
thereby. 
City of New York v. A-1 Jewelry & Pawn, Inc., 247 F.R.D. 296, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007)  
A public nuisance “consists of conduct or omissions which offend, 
interfere with or cause damage to the public in the exercise of rights 
common to all, in a manner such as to offend public morals, interfere 
with the use by the public of a public place, or endanger or injure the 
property, health, safety or comfort of a considerable number of 
persons.” 
(quoting Copart Indus., Inc. v. Consol. Edison Co., 362 N.E.2d 968, 971 (N.Y. 
1977)). 
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821B of the Second Restatement of Torts “sweeps broadly in 
defining a ‘public right,’ including “the public health, the public 
safety, the public peace, the public comfort, or the public 
convenience.”109 In the United States, the non-property based 
public nuisance claim has developed into a cause of action used 
primarily by state and local governments110 to address the 
contributions of a private actor to unhealthy living conditions or 
other unreasonable interference with collective interests.111 In 
the view of its proponents, “[a] public nuisance claim is the 
vehicle provided by civil law for executive-branch officials to seek 
immediate relief to stop and remedy conduct that is endangering 
the public.”112 In the view of its critics, it threatens to become “a 
tort where liability is based upon unidentified ills allegedly 
suffered by unidentified people caused by unidentified products in 
unidentified locations.”113 
Public nuisance has been described by Victor Schwartz as a 
“super tort.”114 It triggers standards of fault and causation that 
                                                                                                     
 
 109. In re StarLink Corn Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 848 (N.D. 
Ill. 2002) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2)(a)).  
 110. Private plaintiffs can also bring suit if they are able to satisfy the 
“special injury” rule. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C(1) (1979) 
(stating that to recover damages, a private plaintiff must have “suffered harm of 
a kind different from that suffered by other members of the public exercising the 
right common to the general public that was the subject of the interference”); see 
also John G. Culhane & Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Defining A Proper Role for 
Public Nuisance Law in Municipal Suits Against Gun Sellers: Beyond Rhetoric 
and Expedience, 52 S.C. L. REV. 287, 291 (2001) (arguing that private actions for 
public nuisance “serve no defensible purpose and should be abolished”). 
 111. See, e.g., City of Miami v. Coral Gables, 233 So.2d 7, 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1970) (public nuisance action brought by Coral Gables on behalf of its 
citizens against air pollution from an incinerator owned and operated by 
Miami); Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Servs., Inc., 426 N.E.2d 824, 827 (Ill. 1981) 
(chemical waste disposal site alleged to be a public nuisance threatening “the 
health of the citizens of the village, the county, and the State”); Maryland v. 
Galaxy Chem., 1 ENV’T REP. CAS. (BNA) 1660, 1661–64 (Md. Cir. Ct. 1970) 
(public nuisance action brought by state on behalf of neighbors exposed to air 
pollution from a nearby chemical plant, some of whom claimed to have been 
injured by its emissions of toxic fumes). 
 112. Kairys, Underlying Policies, supra note 99, at 1176. 
 113. Richard Faulk & John Gray, Alchemy in the Courtroom? The 
Transmutation of Public Nuisance Litigation, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 941, 981–
82 (2007). 
 114. Victor E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, The Law of Public Nuisance: 
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are less rigorous than those applied to personal injury claims. 
Public nuisance is generally understood as a form of strict (or “no 
fault”) liability,115 at least in the context of suits brought by 
governmental plaintiffs.116 In recent decades, however, some 
courts have imposed an illegitimate fault requirement on public 
nuisance claims more generally.117 Although the causation 
requirements are technically the same for nuisance as for any 
other tort, the way in which a nuisance claim is framed alters the 
analysis. At least in theory, public nuisance plaintiffs, who are 
alleging harm to the public at large rather than to any particular 
individual or class of individuals,118 need only prove causation at 
the population level.119  
                                                                                                     
Maintaining Rational Boundaries on a Rational Tort, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 541, 
552 (2006). 
 115. Id. In recent decades, however, some courts have imposed a fault 
requirement on public nuisance claims. See Robert Abrams & Val Washington, 
The Misunderstood Law of Public Nuisance: A Comparison with Private 
Nuisance Twenty Years After Boomer, 54 ALB. L. REV. 359, 367–74 (1990) 
(discussing the “improper imposition of traditional fault concepts on the law of 
public nuisance”). 
 116. See Karol Boudreaux & Bruce Yandle, Public Bads and Public 
Nuisance: Common Law Remedies for Environmental Decline, 14 FORDHAM 
ENVTL. L.J. 55, 62–63 & 63 n.24 (2002) (arguing that “[i]n suits brought by the 
sovereign, liability for public nuisance is strict, however in private action on 
public nuisances cases the liability is based upon the defendant’s negligence” 
but noting that “the liability issue in public nuisance is confused”). 
 117. See Abrams & Washington, supra note 115, at 367–74 (discussing the 
“improper imposition of traditional fault concepts on the law of public 
nuisance”). 
 118. Class action suits are like public nuisance suits in that they provide a 
means for collectivizing private claims. See Developments, The Paths of Civil 
Litigation, Part II: The Use of the Public Nuisance in Tort Against the Handgun 
Industry, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1761 n.12 (2000) (describing generally the 
similarity of class actions and public nuisance with regard to aggregation of 
claims). But class action suits are based on the aggregation of individual claims, 
unlike the claims at issue in public nuisance litigation, which are fundamentally 
collective. 
 119. In recent cases, however, some courts have misunderstood this point 
and imposed a requirement that governmental plaintiffs trace the harm from 
particular defendants to particular individuals. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Am. 
Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126, 134 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (“[P]laintiff has failed to 
allege causation in fact because plaintiff has not identified any specific 
defendant as the source of any lead pigment or paint at any particular 
location.”); Whitehouse v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, No. Civ. A 99-5226, 2003 WL 
1880120 (R.I. Super. Ct. Mar. 20, 2003); Lewis v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 793 N.E.2d 
869, 878 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (“[T]he plaintiffs’ failure to identify the defendants 
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B. The Evolution of Industry-Wide Public Nuisance Litigation as 
a Tool for Public Health 
The great majority of public nuisance cases are of the 
property-based type, which involve the defendant’s use of its 
property in a way that interferes with the rights of others. 
Beginning in the 1980s, however, advocates began to draw more 
heavily on the doctrine of “public right” nuisance, in 
circumstances where the harm to the public’s interest is not 
mediated via property in the possession or control of the 
defendant. Advocates first experimented with this approach in 
the context of asbestos litigation. As asbestos building products 
deteriorate, they release fibers that are carcinogenic when 
inhaled. The dangers of asbestos became widely known in the 
1980s and 1990s as a generation of (mostly) men, exposed to the 
material through their work decades earlier, began to be 
diagnosed with a rare and lethal cancer called mesothelioma. In 
response, regulations were adopted requiring the removal or 
other abatement of asbestos in school buildings.120 Property 
owners became concerned about potential tort liability for 
allowing asbestos to deteriorate on their properties. At the same 
time, individual victims of asbestos-related illnesses sued the 
asbestos industry, though their claims were often stymied by 
their inability to tie the injuries of individual plaintiffs to the 
products of particular manufacturers.121 
Eventually, public nuisance claims were filed against 
asbestos manufacturers by several municipalities and school 
districts suing in their capacity as property owners to recover 
abatement costs. These claims were not based on the argument 
that asbestos-containing buildings constituted a property-based 
nuisance. Rather, they claimed that the manufacture and 
distribution of asbestos products constituted a nuisance.122 These 
                                                                                                     
who supplied the lead pigment used in the paint to which their children were 
exposed constituted a failure to allege facts in support of the causation element 
of the claim.”). 
 120. Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2641–56 
(2011). 
 121. See James L. Stengel, The Asbestos End-Game, 62 N.Y.U ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 223, 236 (2006) (explaining ways claimants may succeed in the absence of 
manufactured products or premises identification testimony). 
 122. Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 114, at 553 (citing Corp. of Mercer 
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non-property-based claims were rejected by most courts.123 In 
Detroit Board of Education v. Celotex Corp.,124 for example, the 
court concluded that products liability, not public nuisance, was 
the proper avenue for bringing such a claim and that a product 
could not constitute a nuisance.125 Courts also relied on the 
argument that nuisance liability requires that the defendant 
have “control” of the nuisance.126 They concluded that this 
element could not be established in a case against a product 
manufacturer because the product is in the control of another 
party (in these cases, the plaintiff property owners themselves) at 
the time that it causes harm.127 
“The watershed event” for industry-wide public nuisance 
litigation came in the 1990s, when several state attorneys general 
added public nuisance claims to their suits against tobacco 
manufacturers, shortly before the Master Settlement Agreement 
                                                                                                     
Univ. v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., No. 85-126-3-MAC, 1986 WL 12447, at *6 (M.D. Ga. 
Mar. 9, 1986)); see also City of Manchester v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 637 F. Supp. 
646, 656 (D.R.I. 1986); Town of Hooksett Sch. Dist. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 617 F. 
Supp. 126, 133 (D.N.H. 1984); Cnty. of Johnson v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 580 F. 
Supp. 284, 294 (E.D. Tenn. 1984). 
 123. See Faulk & Gray, supra note 113, at 957–58 (citing City of San Diego 
v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 30 Cal. App. 4th 575 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)); Tioga Pub. Sch. 
Dist. No. 15 v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 984 F.2d 915, 920–21 (8th Cir. 1993); Cnty. of 
Johnson, 580 F. Supp. at 294 (“[A]llowing . . . this action under a nuisance 
theory would convert almost every products liability action into a nuisance 
claim.”); Detroit Bd. of Educ. v. Celotex Corp., 493 N.W.2d 513, 521 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1992) (stating that “manufacturers, sellers, or installers of defective 
products may not be held liable on a nuisance theory for injuries caused by [a 
product] defect”); Corp. of Mercer Univ. v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., No. 85-126-3-MAC, 
1986 WL 12447, at *6 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 1986) (noting that even if asbestos were 
considered a nuisance, “[t]he ‘nuisance’ creating property . . . was in possession 
and control of the plaintiff from the time it purchased the asbestos-containing 
products”); see also Nat’l Gypsum Co., 637 F. Supp. at 656; W.R. Grace & Co., 
617 F. Supp. at 133. 
 124. Detroit Bd. of Educ. v. Celotex Corp., 493 N.W.2d 513 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1992).  
 125. See id. at 520 (noting that the case is clearly a products liability action 
and may not be characterized as a nuisance). 
 126. See Peter Tips, Controlling the Lead Paint Debate: Why Control is Not 
an Element of Public Nuisance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 605, 607 (2009) (noting that 
courts sometimes impose a control element to public nuisance claims). 
 127. See, e.g., Camden Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. 
Corp., 273 F.3d 536 (3d Cir. 2001); Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 
428 (R.I. 2008). 
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(MSA) was reached.128 Most of these suits did not produce a 
court ruling prior to the MSA, but one federal district court did 
rule on a public nuisance claim in Texas v. American Tobacco 
Co.129 The plaintiffs framed the claim in terms of intentional 
interference with “the public’s right to be free from 
unwarranted injury, disease, and sickness” and alleged that 
the defendants had “caused damage to the public health, the 
public safety, and the general welfare of the citizens.”130 The 
federal district court dismissed the claim on the grounds that it 
was unsupported by Texas case law. Overall, however, the 
MSA was hailed as an enormous achievement by the state 
attorneys general.131 Many have pointed to this practical 
success as generating a groundswell of interest in public 
nuisance litigation, even though it had not produced any court 
opinions supporting its use.132 
Litigation against firearms manufacturers and distributors 
provided the first opportunity for significant numbers of courts 
to adjudicate public nuisance claims based on products 
inherently harmful to the public’s health and safety. Products 
liability had long been an avenue (though often a difficult one) 
                                                                                                     
 128. Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 114, at 554. Others dispute the 
importance of public nuisance claims in turning the tide of tobacco litigation. 
See, e.g., Faulk & Gray, supra note 113, at 958 (noting that “many . . . wrongly 
credit the use of public nuisance claims with turning the tide against the 
tobacco industry” and arguing that “[t]he real turning point [was] the disclosure 
that tobacco companies concealed documents showing the addictive nature of 
smoking, and the nationwide coordinated effort of state-sponsored lawsuits”). In 
any case, David Kairys has said that he saw the state tobacco litigation as a 
model for addressing the role of manufacturers and distributors to contributing 
to the problem of rampant gun violence. See David Kairys, The Origin and 
Development of the Governmental Handgun Cases, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1163, 1172 
(2000) [hereinafter Kairys, Origin and Development].  
 129. Texas v. Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956 (E.D. Tex. 1997) 
(discussed in Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 114, at 554). 
 130. Id. at 972.  
 131. Press Release, Dep’t of Law, State of Georgia, Statement of Attorney 
General Thurbert Baker Regarding Georgia’s Tobacco Litigation (Nov. 20, 1998), 
available at http://law.ga.gov/00/press/detail/0,2668,87670814_89151348_ 
89525625,00.html (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 132. See Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 114, at 554–55 (“Given the sheer 
size of the award and resulting attorneys’ fees, it is not surprising that, since 
the MSA, government and plaintiffs’ lawyers have attempted to apply public 
nuisance theory against many other industries of product manufacturers.”). 
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for plaintiffs suing the firearms industry based on the harms 
associated with gun violence,133 but this litigation was different. 
The public nuisance claims against gun manufacturers were not 
based on allegations that guns were defective products, nor were 
the plaintiffs alleging that the manufacture of guns by itself 
constituted a nuisance. 
Instead, the plaintiffs argued that specific distribution 
practices contributed to a public nuisance by facilitating an illegal 
market for guns. Manufacturers and wholesale distributors were 
alleged to contribute to the nuisance through two principal means: 
First, by continuing to sell to a small number of distributors that 
were known to be responsible for a vastly disproportionate share of 
guns used in crime. Second, by knowingly distributing more guns 
to areas with loose gun laws that were geographically close to 
areas with strict gun laws.134 Although the majority of these suits 
were unsuccessful,135 a few courts allowed them to proceed to 
trial.136 Those that did typically followed the plaintiffs’ lead in 
                                                                                                     
 133. See Thomas F. Segalla, Governmental and Individual Claims in 
Gun Litigation and Coverage: Where to Go from Here?, in INSURANCE 
COVERAGE IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 363 (ALI-ABA Course of Study 2000). 
 134. Kairys, Origin and Development, supra note 128, at 1171–72; see 
also City of Gary ex rel. King v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222, 
1235 (Ind. 2003) (“The City has alleged that (1) dealers engage in illegal 
sales, and (2) the distributors and manufacturers know of their practice 
and have it within their power to curtail them but do not do so for profit 
reasons.”). Plaintiffs in these cases submitted evidence that the “movement 
of guns from the industry’s lawful distribution channels into the illegal 
market” was discussed in industry meetings and that the industry has 
“long known that greater industry action to prevent illegal transactions is 
possible and would curb the supply of firearms to the illegal market.” 
Kintner, supra note 97, at 1187 (quoting Robert Ricker).  
 135. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 
415, 421 (3d Cir. 2002) (dismissing public nuisance claims under 
Pennsylvania law); Camden Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta 
U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d 536, 540 (3d Cir. 2001) (dismissing public nuisance 
claims under New Jersey law); Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 
98, 133 (Conn. 2001) (dismissing public nuisance claims); Penelas v. Arms 
Tech., Inc., 778 So.2d 1042, 1045 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (dismissing 
public nuisance claims); City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp, 821 N.E.2d 
1099, 1111 (Ill. 2004) (dismissing public nuisance claims); People ex rel. 
Spitzer v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 761 N.Y.S.2d 192 (App. Div. 2003) 
(dismissing public nuisance claims). 
 136. See City of Gary ex rel. King, 801 N.E.2d at 1232 (holding that 
plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient to allege an unreasonable chain of 
distribution of handguns sufficient to give rise to a public nuisance 
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focusing on the characterization of the defendants’ particular 
marketing and distribution practices, and not the products 
themselves, as contributing to a nuisance. For example, the 
Ninth Circuit held that a nuisance claim brought by a group of 
private plaintiffs was “not about the manufacture or 
distribution of a defective or properly functioning product . . . 
but rather allege[d] affirmative conduct on the part of 
manufacturers and distributors that fosters” a nuisance.137 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Ohio emphasized the 
argument that the defendants “control the creation and supply 
of [the] illegal, secondary market for firearms, not the actual 
use of the firearms that cause injury.”138 However, this 
approach was far from universally successful. Ultimately, the 
litigation was effectively cut off by Congress via the Protection 
of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act.139 The Act precluded tort 
liability for firearms manufacturers, distributors, and dealers 
based on criminals’ unlawful use of guns. It also called for the 
immediate dismissal of pending suits.140 
A couple of years into the firearms litigation, advocates 
sought to use a similar strategy against the lead paint and 
pigment industry in several states.141 When lead paint 
deteriorates, it produces dust and flakes that can easily be 
ingested by small children. Ingestion of lead, even in small 
quantities, during the early years of life when children’s brains 
are developing rapidly has been associated with “measurable 
changes in children’s mental development and behavior” 
                                                                                                     
generated by defendants); City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 
1999-02590, 2000 Mass. Super. Ct. LEXIS 352, at *63–64 (July 13, 2000) 
(“To be sure, the legal theory is unique in the Commonwealth but . . . that 
is not reason to dismiss at this stage of the proceedings.”); City of 
Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1136 (Ohio 2002) 
(allowing a public nuisance claim to proceed). 
 137. Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1211 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 138. Cincinnati, 768 N.E.2d at 1143. 
 139. Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, Pub. L. No. 109-92, 119 
Stat. 2095 (2005). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Faulk & Gray, supra note 113, at 1009–14 (describing suits in 
Wisconsin, California, Rhode Island, and New Jersey); Schwartz & Goldberg, 
supra note 114, at 559 (describing the partnership between the Rhode Island 
Attorney General’s office and private, contingency-fee counsel). 
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including “hyperactivity; deficits in fine motor function, hand-
eye coordination, and reaction time; and lowered performance 
on intelligence tests.”142 Although the link between lead paint 
and childhood lead poisoning was established more than a 
century ago,143 it wasn’t until 1978 that lead paint was banned in 
the United States144 and much of the housing stock in the United 
States pre-dates the ban.145 Although average blood lead levels 
(BLLs) among Americans declined rapidly in the years 
immediately following bans on lead in gasoline and paint, 
approximately 2.2% of children between the ages of one and five 
still have BLLs associated with significant health impacts.146 
Advocates had attempted to use a variety of legal strategies 
to require—and in some cases subsidize—the abatement of lead 
paint in housing.147 They also filed lawsuits on behalf of 
individual children with elevated BLLs, but these proved even 
more difficult than asbestos suits. Because there is no “signature” 
injury that is linked to lead exposure in the way that 
mesothelioma is linked to asbestos, establishing causation was 
particularly difficult.148 Reduced intellectual capacity and 
                                                                                                     
 142. National Institutes of Health, National Institutes of Environmental 
Health Sciences, Lead (Aug. 29, 2011), http://www.niehs.nih.gov/health/ 
topics/agents/lead/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2012) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 143. Child lead poisoning was first diagnosed in 1897 and was linked to 
lead-based paints in 1904. GOLDFRANK, GOLDFRANK’S TOXICOLOGIC EMERGENCIES 
1310 (8th ed. McGraw-Hill Professional 2006). A handful of European countries 
banned the use of interior white-lead paint in 1909. The League of Nations 
adopted a similar ban in 1922. GILBERT, SG & WEISS, B, A Rationale for 
Lowering the Blood Lead Action Level from 10 to 2 microg/dL, 
27 NEUROTOXICOLOGY 693, 695 (2006). 
 144. Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4831 (2006). 
 145. Joseph Pargola, Childhood Lead Poisoning—Combating a Timeless 
Silent Killer, 37 RUTGERS L. REC. 300, 301. 
 146. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, PREVENTING LEAD 
POISONING IN CHILDREN 2–3 (2005), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/ 
lead/publications/prevlead poisoning.pdf. 
 147. See generally California Department of Community Services and 
Development, Lead-Based Paint Hazard Control Program, http://www.csd.ca. 
gov/Programs/Lead-Based%20Paint%20Hazard%20Control%20Program.aspx 
(last visited Jan. 28, 2012) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 148. See Kenneth Lepage, Lead-Based Paint Litigation and the Problem of 
Causation: Toward a Unified Theory of Market Share Liability, 37 B.C. L. REV. 
155, 158 (1995) (“Due to the generic nature of the effects of lead poisoning, it can 
be difficult to show both that lead poisoning is the cause of specific health 
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behavioral problems can be caused by a wide range of factors, 
many of which are frequently present simultaneously for any 
particular child who has an elevated BLL.149 Epidemiological 
data strongly supports the association between exposure to lead 
paint and increased prevalence of low IQ and behavioral 
problems at the population level. But it can be extremely difficult 
to establish causation with respect to any particular individual.  
Public nuisance litigation offered a potential alternative to 
suits based on individual harms, but its success has been limited. 
The public nuisance claims were based on the theory that the 
presence of lead pigment in homes and other buildings 
constitutes an unreasonable interference with public health and 
safety and that the defendant manufacturers and distributors 
contributed to this nuisance. The Rhode Island Attorney General 
achieved a highly publicized victory in the form of a jury verdict 
that was upheld by the state trial court.150 But the verdict was 
later overturned by the Rhode Island Supreme Court and courts 
in other jurisdictions rejected similar claims.151 The lead paint 
plaintiffs had a more difficult time than the firearms plaintiffs in 
framing the nuisance at issue as associated with the defendants’ 
affirmative conduct rather than the product itself. For example, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court characterized the defendants’ 
conduct as “merely offering an everyday household product for 
sale.”152 This framing of the nuisance at issue as the product 
itself left the claims susceptible to dismissal on the grounds that 
the defendants lacked control over the nuisance at the time that 
                                                                                                     
defects and that a specific case of lead poisoning is due to lead paint.” (footnote 
omitted)); Brenner v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 699 N.Y.S.2d 848, 853 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1999) (stating that “there is no signature injury associated with lead 
poisoning”).  
 149. See Richard L. Canfield et al., Intellectual Impairment in Children with 
Blood Lead Concentrations Below 10 g per Deciliter, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1517, 
1519 (2003) (listing covariables used which were based on established predictors 
of children’s intellectual outcomes). 
 150. Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, No. PC 99-5226, 2007 WL 711824 
(R.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2007). 
 151. Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428 (R.I. 2008); see also 
Faulk & Gray, supra note 113, at 978–79, 1007–14 (describing the failure of 
suits in Wisconsin and New Jersey). 
 152. In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 501 (N.J. 2007).  
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it caused harm.153 To the extent that the nuisance is understood 
to be the product itself, manufacturers cannot be said to control it 
after it is sold to consumers. Nonetheless, despite an overall 
trend toward rejection of industry-wide public nuisance liability, 
as recently as June 2011, several California municipalities 
reached an $8.7 million settlement in a suit against the lead 
paint industry.154 
Industry-wide public nuisance claims also received a 
temporary boost from the decision of the Second Circuit to allow a 
public nuisance suit to proceed against the coal-fired power plant 
industry based on the harms associated with climate change.155 
The decision was ultimately overturned, however, by the 
Supreme Court in June 2011 in American Electric Power Co., Inc. 
v. Connecticut.156 Climate change public nuisance litigation has 
been split between more typical environmental nuisance 
                                                                                                     
 153. Id. at 499; Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d at 455 (overturning jury verdict 
and trial court order because plaintiffs had failed to establish that the 
manufacturers interfered with a public right or that they were in control of the 
lead pigment at the time that it caused harm to Rhode Island children). Courts 
dismissing firearms public nuisance claims relied on similar arguments. See, 
e.g., Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1061–62 (N.Y. 
2001) (finding no duty because gun manufacturers did not control criminals 
with guns, and injuries were too remote); Camden Cnty. Bd. v. Beretta U.S.A. 
Corp., 273 F.3d 536, 541 (finding the causal chain between manufacture of 
handguns and municipal crime-fighting costs too attenuated to attribute 
sufficient control to manufacturers to make out a public nuisance claim); City of 
Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that 
even though illegal use of firearms may constitute a public nuisance, defendant 
was not liable because the firearms were no longer under its control). 
 154. Millennium Holdings Settles Lead Paint Cases for $8.7 Million, 
LITIGATION BLOG, http://www.lexisnexis.com/community/litigationresourcecenter 
/blogs/litigationblog/archive/2011/06/24/millennium-holdings-to-pay-8-7-million-to-
settle-lead-paint-claims.aspx (last visited Jan. 28, 2012) (on file with Washington 
and Lee Law Review). This victory does not necessarily indicate the long-term 
viability of industry-wide public nuisance claims, given that California courts 
have given a particularly expansive interpretation to public nuisance doctrine. 
See Matthew R. Watson, Comment, Venturing into the “Impenetrable Jungle”: 
How California’s Expansive Public Nuisance Doctrine May Result in an 
Unprecedented Judgment Against the Lead Paint Industry in the Case of County 
of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Company, 15 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 
612, 614 (2010). 
 155.  Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 367 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(alleging that emissions from smokestacks of coal-fired power plants contributed 
to the public nuisance of climate change). 
 156. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011). 
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litigation based on emissions from the defendants’ property and 
innovative industry-wide nuisance litigation based on greenhouse 
gas emissions from defendants’ products. The suit that was 
eventually rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court after being 
allowed to proceed by the Second Circuit was a more traditional 
property-based environmental nuisance case.157 The defendants 
were operators of coal-fired power plants that emit greenhouse 
gases from their properties. A suit that was withdrawn by the 
plaintiffs in 2009 after an adverse federal district court ruling 
was more akin to the suits against the lead paint and firearms 
industries. The defendants in California v. General Motors 
Corp.158 were automobile manufacturers and the public nuisance 
claim was based on the contribution of the defendants’ products 
to climate change via their emissions after they were sold and 
used by consumers.159 
C. The Scope of Public Rights in Public Nuisance Law 
The uniquely public nature of public nuisance is in danger of 
being lost amid the current backlash against the cause of action. 
A handful of tort law scholars—including Donald Gifford,160 
Victor Schwartz, and Phil Goldberg161—have articulated a 
scathing (and influential) critique of what they view as a 
proposed expansion of public nuisance liability. They have argued 
that public nuisance claims against products manufacturers 
should be dismissed because they can only be brought under 
products liability law. Several courts have reached the same 
                                                                                                     
 157. Connecticut, 582 F.3d at 367 (alleging that emissions from smokestacks 
of coal-fired power plants contributed to the public nuisance of climate change). 
 158. California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755, 2007 WL 2726871 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).  
 159. Id. (alleging that emissions from the defendants products—
automobiles—contributed to the public nuisance of climate change). 
 160. See generally Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products 
Liability Tort, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 741 (2003) [hereinafter Gifford, Public 
Nuisance]; GIFFORD, supra note 99; Donald G. Gifford, Climate Change and the 
Public Law Model of Torts: Reinvigorating Judicial Restraint Doctrines, 62 S.C. 
L. REV. 201 (2011) [hereinafter Gifford, Climate Change]. 
 161. Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 114, at 552. 
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conclusion,162 effectively rejecting the non-property based, “public 
rights” version of the public nuisance tort. Public nuisance 
advocates have disagreed sharply with this view, arguing that 
products liability is simply not the proper framework for 
understanding the harm that these suits have attempted to 
address.163 They have viewed public nuisance claims as a means 
of addressing the underlying causes of social ills, not as a means 
of marginally increasing the safety of particular products.164 
Courts sense (rightly, I think) that they must be cautious 
about when plaintiffs are allowed to take advantage of the 
flexible fault and causation doctrines associated with public 
nuisance.165 They have been anxious to dismiss industry-wide 
public nuisance claims, but their opinions taken as a whole fail to 
articulate a consistent, principled basis for doing so. In many 
cases, courts have applied more stringent doctrines of fault and 
causation from personal injury law to public nuisance claims,166 
effectively watering down the power of public nuisance by making 
it less different from personal injury analysis. Public nuisance 
advocates have attempted to clarify the principled distinctions 
between public nuisance claims arising out of public harms and 
                                                                                                     
 162. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126, 135 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2005) (finding persuasive defendants’ argument “that plaintiff cannot 
escape the requirement of showing causation in fact by stylizing a products 
liability claim as a public nuisance action”). 
 163. See, e.g., Kairys, Origin and Development, supra note 128, at 1172 
(“[P]reliminary research showed that product liability, I thought, was 
problematic because handguns aren’t defective. That’s not the problem; they 
work quite well—too well, by my light.”).  
 164. See Developments, supra note 118, at 1758–59 (describing municipal 
suits against tobacco firms and handgun manufacturers as novel forms of 
collectivization: “[S]uch litigation takes advantage of the civil law’s flexibility to 
respond to newly recognized problems and exploits its substantive reach to go 
beyond the crimes at issue to address their alleged underlying causes”). Public 
nuisance suits differ from class action suits, however, in that class action suits 
are fundamentally premised on the aggregation of individual claims, whereas 
public nuisance suits are premised on a collective harm. 
 165. See generally Jules Coleman & Arthur Ripstein, Mischief and 
Misfortune, 41 MCGILL L.J. 91 (1995). 
 166. See generally Abrams & Washington, supra note 115; Steven Sarno, In 
Search of a Cause: Addressing the Confusion in Proving Causation of a Public 
Nuisance, 26 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 225 (2009). See also People ex rel. Spitzer v. 
Sturm, Ruger & Co., 761 N.Y.S.2d 192, 207 (App. Div. 2003) (Rosenburger, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the majority opinion “appl[ies] an inapposite 
negligence analysis to this case”). 
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private claims arising out of similar harms to individuals.167 But 
many courts have remained unpersuaded.168 The result is that 
most courts have dismissed industry-wide public nuisance claims 
without determining how best to define “public rights” as a 
means of delineating the boundary between a properly alleged 
public nuisance and other kinds of tort claims.169 
The public right element has been described as “the sine qua 
non of a cause of action for public nuisance.”170 It is grounded in 
the same community-focused theory that animated the 
foundation of American public health law. In his 1893 treatise on 
the law of nuisance, H.G. Wood referred to public nuisance as “a 
part of the great social compact to which every person is a party, 
a fundamental and essential principle in every civilized 
community, that every person yields a portion of his right of 
absolute dominion.”171 In the 1990s, the California Supreme 
Court similarly defined public nuisance as an “interference with 
collective social interests,” noting that it is this “community 
aspect of the public nuisance . . . that distinguishes it from its 
private cousin, and makes possible its use, by means of the 
                                                                                                     
 167. See, e.g., Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d at 134 
Plaintiff asserts that because it is a governmental plaintiff it is not 
required to identify which defendant manufactured the paint found 
on each surface in Chicago where lead-based paint now constitutes a 
hazard. . . . Plaintiff notes that, in the present case, it is not seeking 
to recover for an injury to a particular person or property but, 
instead, it is asserting the right of the public as a whole to be free 
from threats to its health and safety. 
 168. See id. (rejecting the plaintiff’s causation analysis and, in doing so, 
falling back on requiring a tie to property via the causation requirement). 
“[T]here is no reported Illinois public nuisance case involving a viable lawsuit 
brought by any municipality in which identification and causation, including the 
specific location of the nuisance, were not known.” Id. 
 169. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1113 
(Ill. 2005) (noting that although the majority of public nuisance firearms suits 
had been dismissed on some grounds, no court had dismissed a public nuisance 
suit against firearms manufacturers and distributors on the basis of “failure to 
properly plead the existence of a public right affected by the alleged nuisance”). 
 170. 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances § 39 (2002) (quoted in City of Chicago, 821 
N.E.2d at 1115); see also City of Chicago, 821 N.E.2d at 1113–14 (“[T]he first 
element that must be alleged to state a claim for public nuisance is the existence 
of a right common to the general public.”).  
 171. H. WOOD, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NUISANCES IN THEIR 
VARIOUS FORMS; INCLUDING REMEDIES THEREFORE AT LAW AND IN EQUITY § 1 (3d 
ed. 1893). 
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equitable injunction, to protect the quality of organized social 
life.”172 The court drew on the long history of nuisance doctrine, 
noting that “[t]he public nuisance doctrine . . . embodies a kind of 
collective ideal of civil life which the courts have vindicated by 
equitable remedies since the beginning of the 16th century.”173 
Despite wide agreement that interference with a public right 
is the central element of a public nuisance,174 courts and 
commentators have struggled in their attempts to use the public 
right element as a means for defining the substantive scope of the 
cause of action. The Restatement’s broad formulation of a public 
nuisance as involving “a significant interference with the public 
health, the public safety, the public peace, the public comfort or 
the public convenience”175 has been widely quoted, but rarely 
dispositive.176 The criteria set forth in the second edition of 
American Jurisprudence are only slightly more instructive. A 
public nuisance “must affect an interest common to the general 
public, must produce a common injury, or be dangerous or 
injurious to the general public, or it must be harmful to the public 
health, or prevent the public from a peaceful use of their land and 
the public streets, or there must be some direct encroachment on 
public property.”177 
In the context of recent litigation against the firearms and 
lead paint industries, courts that have considered the application 
of the public right requirement in detail have been split as to 
whether public rights are implicated. Courts allowing public 
nuisance claims to proceed have typically framed the public right 
                                                                                                     
 172. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 604 (Cal. 1997). 
 173. Id. at 603 (enjoining street gang members from conducting violent and 
intimidating activities in a San Jose neighborhood).  
 174. See, e.g., Young v. Bryco Arms, 765 N.E.2d 1, 10 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) 
(“The first element that a plaintiff must allege in order to state a claim for 
public nuisance is the existence of ‘a right common to the general public.’”).  
 175. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979). 
 176. For the rare exception, see, for example, Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 
1191, 1209–10 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that California had adopted the 
Restatement’s five categories of public rights, [public health, safety, peace, 
comfort, or convenience] and then parroting without discussion the plaintiffs’ 
complaint that the plaintiffs’ gunshot injuries were violations of their public 
rights to “health, safety, and welfare”).  
 177. 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances § 39 (2002) (quoted in City of Chicago v. 
Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1115 (Ill. 2005)). 
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at issue in broad terms that echo those of the Restatement. In 
Young v. Bryco Arms (a firearms case), for example, an Illinois 
court was swayed by the plaintiffs’ fairly broad assertion that 
“the rights of plaintiffs and others to use the streets and public 
ways without fear, apprehension and injury”178 amounted to a 
public right, but the same court renounced similar reasoning in a 
subsequent case.179 Similarly, in Lewis v. Lead Industries Ass’n (a 
lead paint case), another Illinois court noted that “[t]he public 
health and safety are common rights an interference with which 
is sufficient to support a public nuisance claim.”180 For the most 
part, however, courts that have explicitly considered the public 
right element have rejected such broad assertions. In a firearms 
case, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected a public right to be “free 
from unreasonable jeopardy to health, welfare, and safety, and 
from unreasonable threats of danger to person and property, 
caused by the presence of illegal weapons in the city of 
Chicago.”181 Similarly, in overturning the jury verdict for the 
plaintiffs in the Rhode Island lead paint case, the state Supreme 
Court rejected the public right “to be free from the hazards of 
unabated lead,” noting that “this contention falls far short of 
alleging an interference with a public right as traditionally has 
been understood in the law of public nuisance. The state’s 
allegation that defendants have interfered with the ‘health, 
safety, peace, comfort or convenience of the residents of the 
[s]tate’ . . . standing alone does not constitute an allegation of 
interference with a public right.”182 This argument ignores near-
universal adoption of the Restatement’s formulation of public 
health as firmly entrenched within the scope of public rights. It 
also disregards the role of state and local government officials 
                                                                                                     
 178. Bryco Arms, 765 N.E.2d at 11 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). Other courts have held, however, that the concept of unreasonable 
interference with public rights does not include the sale and distribution of 
handguns that pose a threat to public safety. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. 
Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415, 421–22 (3d Cir. 2002); Camden Cnty. Bd. of 
Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d 536, 541–42 (3d Cir. 
2001). 
 179. See infra note 206.  
 180. Lewis v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 793 N.E.2d 869, 878 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). 
 181. City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1114 (Ill. 
2005). 
 182. State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 453 (R.I. 2008).  
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suing in their parens patriae role, which has long been 
understood to encompass public health protection. 
IV. Theorizing the Public in Public Health and Public Nuisance 
Although the theoretical debate over new public health law 
and the doctrinal debate over industry-wide public nuisance 
litigation have each generated substantial scholarly commentary, 
no one has noted the parallels between them.183 In both contexts, 
as described above, designating a concern as “public” alters the 
way in which it is balanced against protections for individual 
rights and interests. To borrow William Novak’s formulation, the 
public label designates “a special sphere of social activity, a 
sphere distinctly cognizable as an object of governance.”184 Both 
debates have been triggered by advocates’ efforts to reach beyond 
the immediate causes of modern social problems to address their 
underlying roots. In doing so, advocates have attempted to make 
use of venerable legal tools for addressing public problems. In 
response to perceived overreaching, critics of a broader scope for 
public health and public rights have argued for a more 
circumscribed understanding of the “public.” 
The linkages between industry-wide public nuisance 
litigation and the new public health law movement are evident in 
the writings of David Kairys, a legal scholar who played a 
significant role in developing the public nuisance strategy against 
the firearms industry.185 Kairys’s account suggests that the 
                                                                                                     
 183. Although Epstein has written separately about public nuisance law, see 
Richard A. Epstein, Federal Preemption, and Federal Common Law, in Nuisance 
Cases, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 551, 559–60 (2008) (discussing property-based public 
nuisance claims), he has not explicitly connected his two critiques. He 
specifically includes “public nuisances like widespread pollution” as among the 
proper objects of “old” public health law. But in his work on the scope of public 
health law, he has not referred to public nuisance litigation against product 
manufacturers. Epstein, In Defense of the “Old” Public Health, supra note 83, at 
1425. In arguing that the “new” public health approach “extends regulation into 
inappropriate areas,” Epstein does, however, refer specifically to the regulation 
of product markets. Id. 
 184. NOVAK, supra note 31, at 86. 
 185. Kairys, Origin and Development, supra note 128, at 1163. The public 
nuisance litigation strategy was first developed in Philadelphia, but the mayor 
of Philadelphia eventually backed away from filing suit and chose instead to 
collaborate with the National Rifle Association to lobby for additional federal 
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strategy arose out of exactly the sort of “root cause” analysis that 
the ecological model of public health has sought to promote. 
Kairys explains that in 1996, he was asked to serve alongside 
police officers, prosecutors, and community activists on a gun 
violence taskforce for the city of Philadelphia. The group also 
included police officers, prosecutors, and community and religious 
activists. They sought to address gun violence, not as a 
“regrettably normal phenomenon in our society,” but rather as an 
“intolerable, unacceptable” problem that they sought to “figure 
out.”186 Ultimately, the taskforce traced gun violence to an 
environment in which guns are readily available on the black 
market, thanks to the distribution practices of gun 
manufacturers and their wholesale distributors.187 
The distinction between the product liability strategy and the 
public nuisance strategy maps nicely onto the contrasting models 
of public health described above. Products liability claims aimed 
at altering the design of particular firearms, for example, are 
more in line with an agent model of gun violence. If the gun is the 
agent that causes injury, then the solution is to alter the gun 
itself. The individually-oriented causation analysis applied to 
products liability also maps onto the agent model of public health 
by focusing on establishing clear ties between specific causes and 
specific outcomes. On the other hand, public nuisance claims 
against the firearms industry as a whole to address marketing 
and distribution practices that influence where guns are located 
is more in keeping with an ecological model. The public nuisance 
suits put forward understanding of harmful products like 
firearms as posing “an environmental threat as well as [being] the 
object of a series of commercial transactions that caused a 
clustering of individual illnesses through product exposure.”188 
Kairys, in his role as public nuisance advocate, explicitly 
turned to the terminology of public health to describe the 
firearms market: 
                                                                                                     
funds for law enforcement. The strategy was quickly picked up by other city and 
state governments, however. See Carl T. Bogus, Gun Litigation and Societal 
Values, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1353, 1353–56 (2000). 
 186. Kairys, Origin and Development, supra note 128, at 1164. 
 187. Id. at 1173. 
 188. GIFFORD, supra note 99, at 84 (emphasis added). 
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What was clear to me was that the . . . moving force for 
demand in this industry is fear. You can think of it as an 
epidemic, as the public health people might think of it, but it’s 
an epidemic that’s spread not by a virus or a bacteria. It’s an 
epidemic that’s spread by fear. And unlike most epidemics, the 
cause is also posed as the solution. The solution—more guns—
just further spreads the epidemic.189 
This use of the term “epidemic” with respect to non-
communicable threats to health has been decried by Epstein as 
fostering a predisposition toward government intrusion as an 
appropriate response.190 For Epstein, modern public health 
epidemics like obesity and diabetes are not “epidemics” at all. 
Indeed, Epstein points to the epidemic label as having 
implications similar to those of the public label: “There are no 
non-communicable epidemics. . . . [T]he designation of obesity as 
a public health epidemic is designed to signal that state coercion 
is appropriate, and it is just that connection that is missing.”191 
Writing about the scope of public health law, Hall cautions that 
the public health perspective tends toward a “habit of thought” 
whereby “having identified a causal connection to a widespread 
health problem, action is necessary to eradicate the cause and 
eliminate the problem at its source, and it falls within the 
authority of public health or other government officials to take 
the necessary actions.” He could just as easily have been 
describing David Kairys’s story about the gun violence task force.  
The efforts of public health and public nuisance critics to 
theorize a narrower vision of the public have proceeded from the 
presumption that it must be more than the mere aggregation of 
individual interests, rights, or harms. Efforts to define what this 
“something more” might be have thus far proceeded along two 
main paths. Some have turned to theoretically specious means for 
designating a private sphere in which harms cannot be conceived 
of as “public.” Others have turned to the conception of indivisible 
public goods. Both conceptions lead to relatively narrow grounds 
of justification for restraints on liberty, even in the hands of 
proponents of a broader understanding of public health.192 
                                                                                                     
 189. Kairys, Origin and Development, supra note 128, at 1167–68. 
 190. Epstein, supra note 11, at S154. 
 191. Id. 
 192. See Bruce Jennings, Public Health and Liberty: Beyond the Millian 
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A. Aggregation Is Insufficient 
Hall has described the “key insight” of his critique of public 
health law as follows: “in the legal arena, public has a specialized 
meaning that is quite different from ordinary parlance. In the 
legal arena, public does not simply mean ‘widespread.’”193 Pope 
puts a similar insight in terms of identifying an appropriate 
liberty limiting principle for public health interventions. He notes 
the argument by Mary Ann Glendon and others that many 
behaviors that are seemingly purely self-regarding behaviors 
(those posing no risk of harm to others and thus properly 
conceived of as “private”) in fact impose economic costs on society 
in the form of medical expenses and lost productivity. But Pope 
disputes this as a justification for government intrusion: “[W]hile 
there may be cases in which aggregate de minimus self-regarding 
harm becomes collective harm, more is needed before the mere 
invocation of ‘the community’ justifies limiting liberty.”194 
Ironically, Dan Beauchamp, a pioneer in theorizing the 
ethical foundations of the ecological model of public health,195 
expressed a similar sentiment in championing a broad conception 
of public health. And he did so decades before Hall and Epstein 
offered the same notion as a critique. 
The public or the people were presumed to have an interest, 
held in common, in self-protection or preservation from threats 
of all kinds to their welfare. . . . The central principles 
underlying the police or regulatory power were the treatment 
of health and safety as a shared purpose and need of the 
community and (aside from basic constitutional rights such as 
due process) the subordination of the market, property, and 
                                                                                                     
Paradigm, PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 2, no. 2, 131 (2009) (“[P]ublic health ethics must 
go beyond the Millian paradigm and its individualism.”). The author also notes 
that “the normative justification for public health practice outside a very narrow 
range” cannot be sustained. Id. at 130. 
 193. Hall, supra note 65, at S204. 
 194. Pope, supra note 9, at 32. 
 195. See, e.g., Dan E. Beauchamp, Public Health As Social Justice, in NEW 
ETHICS FOR THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH 101, 101 (Dan E. Beauchamp & Bonnie 
Steinbock eds., 1999) (article originally appeared in 1976) (“[O]ur most 
intractable public problems . . . result in significant part from arrangements 
that are providing substantial benefits or advantages to a majority or to a 
powerful minority of citizens. . . . It is not sufficiently appreciated that these 
same bleak realities plague attempts to protect the public’s health.”). 
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individual liberty to protect compelling community 
interests. . . . In this scheme, public health and safety are not 
simply the aggregate of each private individual’s interest in 
health and safety, interests which can be pursued more 
effectively through collective action.196  
Notably for my purposes, Beauchamp’s statement could just as 
easily have been written in reference to the definition of public 
rights in public nuisance law.  
This rejection of the public as merely “widespread” has been 
equally crucial in courts’ and commentators’ rejection of the 
existence of a public right in the firearms and lead paint 
litigation. Courts have expressed the idea that aggregated private 
harms are not grounds for a public rights public nuisance claim. 
For example, in City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., the court 
“quer[ied] whether the public right asserted by plaintiffs is 
merely an assertion, on behalf of the entire community, of the 
individual right not to be assaulted.”197 Similarly, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court, in In re Lead Paint Litigation, expressed 
skepticism as to “whether the condition addressed [lead paint 
exposure] truly affects a common right rather than merely 
affecting many people.”198 In overturning a jury verdict holding 
lead paint manufacturers liable for contributing to a public 
nuisance, the Rhode Island Supreme Court noted that the 
meaning of public right could not be so broad as “to encompass all 
behavior that causes a widespread interference with the private 
rights of numerous individuals.”199 
The collective–individual distinction is referenced in a 
comment to the Restatement, which cautions that a public right 
“is collective in nature and not like the individual right that 
everyone has not to be assaulted or defamed or defrauded or 
negligently injured.” Donald Gifford and others have built on this 
                                                                                                     
 196. Dan Beauchamp, Community: The Neglected Tradition of Public 
Health, 15 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 28, 29 (1985) (emphasis added). 
 197. City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1115 (Ill. 
2005) (holding defendants’ marketing of firearms did not constitute a public 
nuisance in Illinois). 
 198. In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 501 (N.J. 2007). Ultimately, 
however, the court deferred to the legislature’s interpretation of a broader 
meaning of “common right” that would encompass a public nuisance created by 
lead paint and dismissed the claim on other grounds. Id. 
 199. Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 453 (2008). 
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distinction to argue that conduct that harms a large number of 
people does not necessarily interfere with a public right. In many 
cases, widespread harms are better understood as a simple 
aggregation of individual harms without any special significance 
for communal interests. Gifford uses the example of 
contaminated hamburgers to illustrate the point: 
Even if the owners of a fast-food chain were to sell millions of 
defectively produced hamburgers causing harm to millions of 
people who ate them, the violation of rights is a series of 
separate violations of private rights—typical tort or contract 
rights that the consumers might have—not a violation of the 
rights of the general public, or of the public as the public. The 
sheer number of violations does not transform the harm from 
individual injury to communal injury.200 
The critics of new public health would likely take issue with 
Gifford’s characterization of contaminated meat as not within the 
legitimate corpus of distinctly public harms. They have typically 
included actions to ensure the safety of the food supply as among 
the legitimate functions of “old” public health.201 The devil, it 
seems, is in the details—if the “public” requires something more 
than simple aggregation, then how should that “something more” 
be defined and theorized? 
B. Public Spaces 
Gifford’s conception of the public appears to rely on a notion 
that at least some problems cannot properly be deemed public 
simply by virtue of their originating in private places at the 
hands of private actors. In 2003, Gifford wrote that “[p]roducts 
generally are purchased and used by individual consumers. Any 
harm they cause—even if the use of the product is widespread 
and the manufacturer’s or distributor’s conduct is unreasonable—
                                                                                                     
 200. GIFFORD, supra note 99, at 146; see also In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 
A.2d at 501. In re Lead Paint Litig. expressed skepticism as to whether lead 
paint poisoning “truly affects a common right rather than merely affecting many 
people,” but ultimately deferred to the legislature’s interpretation of a broader 
meaning of “common right” that would encompass a public nuisance created by 
lead paint. Id. 
 201. See Hall, supra note 65, at S204. 
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is not an actionable violation of a public right.”202 For Gifford, 
there is nothing public about contaminated hamburgers 
consumed in privately owned establishments by individual 
consumers. His commentary has been particularly influential in 
the lead paint cases. In critiquing the lead paint public nuisance 
claims, Gifford argues that “[t]he concept of public right as that 
term has been understood in the law of public nuisance does not 
appear to be broad enough to encompass the right of a child who 
is lead-poisoned as a result of exposure to deteriorated lead-based 
paint in private residences or child-care facilities operated by 
private owners.”203 His reasoning is baffling to anyone familiar 
with the critical deconstruction of the public–private distinction: 
“Despite the tragic nature of the child’s illness, the exposure to 
lead-based paint usually occurs within the most private and 
intimate of surroundings, his or her own home.”204 Feminist 
scholars and others have harshly and thoroughly critiqued the 
carving out of the home as a private sphere in which the public 
interest should have no influence.205 Nonetheless, Gifford’s 
reasoning is apparently appealing to courts, at least two of which 
have quoted the above language in dismissing lead paint 
nuisance claims.206 
                                                                                                     
 202. GIFFORD, supra note 99, at 146. 
 203. Id. at 147. 
 204. Id.; see also Faulk & Gray, supra note 113, at 983–84 (“[T]he alleged 
problems did not threaten the exercise of any rights held by the public at large, 
such as the use of public buildings or resources, but rather related to the 
exercise of private rights by private individuals in their private abodes.”). 
 205. See Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction, 45 
STAN. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (1992). 
 206. So influential, in fact, that the same Illinois Appeals Court that had 
accepted a broad reading of public rights in an earlier case, Lewis v. Lead 
Industries Ass’n, Inc. 793 N.E.2d 869 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003), was so swayed by 
Gifford’s reasoning and the defense arguments inspired by it, that it renounced 
Lewis’s conclusion in a subsequent case. See City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid 
Co., 823 N.E.2d 126, 132–33 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). The court quoted Gifford and 
noted: 
[P]laintiff alleges that the nuisance, if one exists, occurs in 
unidentified buildings owned by private property owners. Defendants 
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because the alleged conditions exist within private homes, which the 
general public has no right to enter, and therefore do not interfere 
with any “public right.” 
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Gifford applies similar reasoning to tobacco litigation. He 
rejects the argument that public nuisance liability could attach to 
harms experienced by primary smokers, but he draws a 
distinction when it comes to harms associated with secondhand 
smoke, on quite unconventional grounds: “Conceivably, a victim 
of tobacco related-illness who could prove that her disease 
resulted from ‘second-hand’ smoke, particularly in public places 
such as public parks or while walking on public thoroughfares, 
could satisfy this first requirement of public nuisance.”207 The 
typical distinction between being the primary smoker and being 
exposed to secondhand smoke is that self-protection (choosing not 
to smoke) is not possible for the person exposed to secondhand 
smoke. Gifford’s emphasis on the notion that harms associated 
with secondhand smoke are particularly actionable through 
public nuisance where the exposure occurs in “public parks” or 
“public thoroughfares” offers a novel spin on that distinction. 
Gifford’s focus on public spaces may also provide some 
explanation for his acceptance of the public right argument with 
respect to the firearms litigation.208 Perhaps Gifford is swayed by 
the framing of the public right violation in the firearms litigation 
as interference with the public’s “peaceful use of public streets, 
sidewalks, parks, and other public places.”209 In any case, this 
place-based view of the public–private distinction has not taken 
hold among the liberal critics of new public health. Even Epstein 
agrees that environmental pollution and contamination of the 
food supply are legitimate concerns of his favored “old” public 
health.210 Presumably this holds for Epstein even when these 
                                                                                                     
Id. at 132. Somewhat confusingly, the court also acknowledged, however, that 
“[a] public nuisance is actionable even where the nuisance is present on private 
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case on proximate cause grounds. Id.; see also In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 
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 207. Gifford, Public Nuisance, supra note 160, at 817. 
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 209. City of New York v. A-1 Jewelry & Pawn, Inc., 247 F.R.D. 296, 349 
(E.D.N.Y 2007) (holding the City of New York had sufficiently pled a public 
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 210. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Principles of Environmental 
Protection: The Case of Superfund, 2 CATO J. 9, 33–34 (1982) (suggesting that 
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threats are experienced by people within private homes or as a 
result of purchases from private businesses. 
C. Public Goods 
A more theoretically sound basis for the public–private 
distinction is offered by Epstein and Hall, who have emphasized 
the indivisible nature of public goods (such as clean air or herd 
immunity) in defining what it is that sets the truly public apart 
from the aggregation of private concerns. Epstein, not 
unexpectedly, defines the difference between “old” public health 
and new public health in economic terms: 
For its part, the old public health tracks the idea of public 
goods in economics, namely, those non-excludable goods that 
cannot be supplied to one unless they are also given to 
another. . . . It thus invokes an analogous concept for “public 
bads”: those harms inflicted on others without their consent, 
as, for example, both communicable diseases and pollution.211 
By contrast, in Epstein’s view, modern public health has become 
“unmoored from the economic conception of a (non-excludable) 
public good.”212 Similarly, Hall has argued that “[i]n the legal 
arena, public . . . invokes a special set of justifications for 
government intervention and coercion that rely on concepts that 
economists refer to as ‘public goods.’”213 Proponents of public 
health intervention have also described public health in terms of 
protecting public goods. Michael Walzer, for example, defined 
public health law as “focus[ing] on the provision and protection of 
public goods, without specific allocation to individuals.214 
                                                                                                     
to private relief”); Richard A. Epstein, Eggs and Avastin, FORBES (Aug. 23, 
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 212. Id. at S148. 
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officials, overstepping this public good distinction, might “use their vast legal 
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 214. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND 
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Similarly, James Childress and Ruth Gaare Bernheim have 
written that “[t]he health of the public is a public good because it 
is not just the sum of individual health indices and cannot be 
attained through individual actions alone.”215 For Hall and 
Epstein, however, the public goods criteria amounts to a narrow 
justification for “old” public health measures to address 
communicable infectious disease threats, pollution of the natural 
environment, and contaminated food.216  
A parallel argument has been made with respect to public 
nuisance law. Modern courts and commentators have read early 
cases as limiting the recognition of public rights to “those 
indivisible resources shared by the public at large, such as air, 
water, or public rights of way.”217 This conception of public rights 
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 216. See Hall, supra note 65, at S204 
The classic subjects of public health law are communicable diseases, 
personal hygiene, sanitary water and sewer systems, safe food, and 
injury prevention. These disparate situations all involve significant 
collective action problems, meaning that individuals acting in their 
own self-interest, even if fully informed and rational, will not 
effectively address the problem because they do not internalize some 
of the major costs or benefits of action or non-action, or for other 
reasons a centralized response is much more cost-effective. . . . 
Identifying and eliminating the source of contagion for a 
communicable disease requires more effort and cost than any one 
individual or small group is likely to undertake. A public agency is 
necessary to garner the resources needed for collective action and to 
wield the authority for coercive restrictions on liberty or property. 
 217. State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 454 (R.I. 2008) (“The term 
public right is reserved more appropriately for those indivisible resources 
shared by the public at large, such as air, water, or public rights of way.”) (citing 
City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126, 131, 139 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2005)); see also Graham Oil Co. v. BP Oil Co., 885 F. Supp. 716, 723 (W.D. Penn. 
1994) (including the rights to soil and water free of contamination as public 
rights); City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 126 F. Supp. 2d 882, 908–
09 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (comparing plaintiffs’ assertion of a public “right to be free 
from guns and violence” to a public right to unpolluted water and then rejecting 
the plaintiffs’ argument), aff’d, 277 F.3d 415 (3d Cir. 2002); Philadelphia Elec. 
Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 316 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding the right to pure 
water is a public right); Celanese Corp. v. Coastal Water Auth., 475 F. Supp. 2d 
623, 639 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (listing the enjoyment of clean air and water as 
examples of public rights); Gifford, Public Nuisance, supra note 160, at 793 
(noting that “the obstruction of highways or diversion of watercourses” are 
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as public goods first emerged from the application of public 
nuisance to environmental pollution. It harkens back to nuisance 
cases that recognized rights to clean air and water and safe and 
unobstructed use of public rights of way, but it fails to reach back 
to the earlier conception of collectively held rights to public 
health and welfare out of which those more specific 
environmental rights arose. The application of public nuisance to 
problems like lead paint in homes and the illegal firearms market 
put pressure on the public goods formulation. As described above, 
advocates and courts have increasingly eschewed broad 
statements of a right to public health and welfare in favor of 
narrower (and increasingly awkward) assertions of rights to 
specific public goods stated in affirmative terms. Recently 
asserted public goods include “a climate that will not drastically 
change as a result of greenhouse gas ‘pollution,’ thereby 
devastating the ecology and the human population”218 and “the 
benefits of the laws governing the unlawful possession and use of 
firearms.”219 When the interests at issue are framed so narrowly, 
it’s not difficult to see why courts have been quick to dismiss the 
argument that they are protected by longstanding common law 
rights.  
V. Epidemiological Harms as Public Bads 
The implementation of measures that integrate new public 
health science and practice into public health law and policy is 
proceeding rapidly. Measures aimed at altering the social 
environment in ways that influence health behaviors and outcomes 
are supported by public health science,220 but they are perhaps 
rushing ahead of adequate theorization in terms of values other 
than population health. For the most part, the defense of new public 
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health law has relied on the overarching value of health as the 
justification for placing community needs on equal footing with 
individual rights. But this vision is in tension with the liberal 
foundations of American law, which require rigorous justification of 
community needs before they are allowed to trump individual 
rights. What is required is a middle position between critics, who 
support only the narrowest articulation of public health law as the 
law of communicable disease control, and defenders of new public 
health, who appear to understand any widespread health problem 
as legitimately falling within the purview of public health law.  
Designating a concern as a public health threat has important 
legal consequences. To the extent that the public is invoked as a 
liberty-limiting principle,221 it should be thoughtfully defined and 
theorized. The problem, of course, is defining what special quality 
marks an interest as sufficiently collective or communal, beyond the 
large number of people affected. The justification provided by the 
public–goods and public–places theories of the public are 
dissatisfying in their narrowness. I propose that part of the solution 
to more fully theorizing the public as a justification for public health 
intervention is supplementation of the public goods formulation 
with an enhanced conception of public bads. This enhanced 
conception moves beyond a purely economic understanding by 
drawing on the science of epidemiology. I argue that epidemiological 
harms—those for which causation can be established at the 
population level, but which cannot necessarily be traced to any 
individual victim—should be understood as public bads. This 
conception offers an expanded understanding of the public as a 
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justification for public health intervention. It also promotes an even 
firmer rooting of public health law and policy in the science and 
practice of new public health, rather than seeking (as Hall and 
Epstein do) to divide the politics of public health from its science. 
A. A Broader Conception of the Public 
In a subtle but fundamental way, the division between science 
and law championed by Hall and Epstein would disconnect public 
health from the explicitly progressive mission that has been integral 
to its disciplinary identity for centuries. The dichotomy relied upon 
by Hall and Epstein misses important distinctions within the 
discipline of public health. “Eliminating threats to public health”222 
involves multiple activities. This project is far from solely “the 
domain”223 of law. There are at least four broad categories of activity 
at issue here: science, practice, policy, and law. The lines are 
necessarily blurred among them. It is not possible for the science of 
public health (the activity of “[a]dvancing understanding and 
knowledge of the causes and patterns of health conditions in 
society”)224 to exist in a vacuum. The questions it seeks to answer 
(and the answers it eventually provides) are informed by practice, 
policy, and law. The scientific identification of causal pathways is 
intimately tied to the policy work of  developing and evaluating 
potential interventions to disrupt them. The practice of public 
health (by which I mean the activity of implementing interventions 
to protect and promote health, only some of which make use of legal 
tools) is useless unless it is informed by science and guided by policy. 
And public health policy (by which I mean the body of defined 
objectives of public health science and practice) easily blends into 
the law, in which it is expressed. As Daniel Goldberg has written in 
response to the critique of new public health put forth by Mark 
Rothstein, “either the social epidemiologists’ contention that 
socioeconomic disparities are a primary factor in causing good public 
health is accurate, or it is not.”225  
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[I]f socioeconomic disparities are truly productive of public 
health, policies consistent with the narrow model, which by 
definition do nothing to ameliorate social conditions, will do little 
to actually improve health in the aggregate. . . . If public health 
practice is not intended to facilitate the public’s health, it is 
unclear what use such practice has and why public monies 
should be forthcoming to support it.226  
To the extent that the liberal critics of new public health seek to 
apply a narrow definition to all efforts to “eliminat[e] threats to 
public health,”227 their critique would disconnect not only public 
health law, but also public health policy and practice, from the 
progressive mission of improving population health. 
The formulation of public health and public rights as limited to 
securing public goods ignores the wider diversity of harms that 
public health law and public nuisance law have been used to 
address, not just in the past decade, but for centuries. Earlier courts 
addressing public nuisances in the form of vicious dogs,228 
fireworks,229 and snake handling230 were far more comfortable with 
broad statements of the state’s authority to enjoin and seek redress 
for unreasonable interferences with public health and welfare. In 
State ex rel. Swann v. Pack,231 for example, the Tennessee Supreme 
Court defined a public nuisance as “a condition of things which is 
prejudicial to the health, comfort, safety, property, sense of decency, 
or morals of the citizens at large, resulting either from an act not 
warranted by law, or from neglect of a duty imposed by law.”232 In 
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holding that the defendants’ practice of snake handling amounted to 
a public nuisance, the court apparently felt no need to assert a 
narrow public right to a community free of unrestrained venomous 
snakes.233 Rather, it emphasized the impact of this practice on the 
safety of the community as a whole in broad terms.234 When some 
state legislatures codified public nuisance law around the turn of 
the century, they too framed their definitions of nuisance in ways 
that relied heavily on a broad conception of collective interests in 
public health and welfare.235 The state’s police power—its authority 
and responsibility for securing the public’s health and welfare—has 
always been greater in scope than the liberal critique suggests. 
The great appeal of public nuisance for advocates eager to take 
on problems like the illegal gun market, the contamination of urban 
housing stock with lead paint, and climate change is that (in theory 
at least) it allows plaintiffs to establish causation at the population, 
rather than individual, level. The doctrinal framework that should 
make this possible is liberty-limiting in its own way.236 By allowing 
for recovery of damages and or injunctive relief against private 
actors in the absence of proof that traces the actions of any 
individual defendant to the harms suffered by any individual 
person, public nuisance arguably threatens to infringe on economic 
liberty. But for decades, centuries even, this intrusion has been 
deemed acceptable based on the notion of the state’s role (through 
the courts as well as through governmental plaintiffs representing 
the executive branch) in protecting the uniquely collective interest 
in healthy living conditions. In many cases, this collective interest 
has been framed in terms of the natural environment—as in cases 
involving air or water pollution. But in others it has been 
understood in terms of the built environment—as in cases involving 
obstruction of roadways or watercourses, for example. And even the 
social environment has been implicated in cases involving gang 
violence, snake handling, or brothels. The collectively held public 
rights recognized in the common law of public nuisance allow for 
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vindication of harms that are suffered by the public as a whole, 
harms that cannot easily be broken down into an aggregation of 
private harms. In a public nuisance cause of action the plaintiff may 
be able to establish that the defendant’s actions have contributed to 
unhealthy living conditions, which have resulted in harms that are 
quantifiable at the population level by epidemiologists, even if the 
plaintiff cannot establish that any particular individual is 
identifiable as the victim of those harms. It is out of this vision of 
public nuisance that I draw my proposal of epidemiological harms as 
a supplement to the economic conception of public bads. 
B. The Economic Conception of Public Bads 
Traditionally, public bads have been understood in economic 
terms. In nuisance law, for example, the distinction between a 
private nuisance and a public one can be understood in terms of the 
distinction between private bads and public bads.237 Private bads 
are “external costs that affect, and are confined to, easily defined 
economic agents.”238 The classic private nuisance example is that of 
a factory that is spewing soot and ashes on clothes strung up to dry 
at the neighboring laundry. The doctrine of public nuisance gives a 
private right of action to the owner of the laundry, which allows him 
or her to negotiate with the owner of the factory. But the same 
approach doesn’t work for public bads. The nature of a public bad “is 
such that there is no low-cost way to insulate and partition the 
affected individuals in the group from the negative effect. What one 
group member receives, all receive.”239 For example, if an entire 
village is affected by emissions from a local copper smelter, there is 
a free rider problem posed by the potential use of a private cause of 
action by any individual homeowner. Because any solution (in the 
form of abating the pollution) would benefit everyone equally, 
whether they had helped bear the costs of litigation or not, it is 
difficult for any individual homeowner to bring suit. “The cost of 
organizing and the tendency for individuals to free ride works 
against the individual’s success.”240 
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This concept of public bads as indivisible negative externalities 
is intimately linked to the economic concept of public goods that has 
played a prominent role in public health law and public nuisance 
law. It is perhaps more natural to describe the copper smelter 
problem in negative terms that focus on the public nature of the 
harm suffered by the homeowners of the village, rather than in 
affirmative terms that focus on a right to the public good of clean 
air, but the concept is essentially the same. Both ways of thinking 
about the problem emphasize economic concerns about collective 
action. Public health can also be conceptualized in these terms. 
Advocates of the new public health have identified the central 
importance of economic concepts like public goods and negative 
externalities in defining the scope of public health law at the 
beginning of its modern revival. “Public health . . . has as its chief 
duty the unenviable tasks of providing common goods and 
controlling negative externalities, both difficult at best.”241 The herd 
immunity achieved through compulsory vaccination programs is 
readily understood as a public good that requires individual 
sacrifices for the common benefit. By contrast, it is more difficult to 
frame “lifestyle” diseases—which we have been conditioned to think 
of in terms of individual behavior choices—in terms of public goods. 
In response to Hall’s and Epstein’s critiques, Lawrence Gostin and 
Gregg Bloche have emphasized the continued role of externality 
analysis in justifying governmental responses to environmental 
toxins, insufficient time and space for exercise, and nutritionally 
adequate food in public schools.”242 They have also pointed to 
insufficient information about health risks, and the ability of private 
industry to influence people’s preferences through marketing efforts. 
This statement provides a helpful starting point, but it fails to fully 
elaborate a substantive response to the liberal critique. For the most 
part, the Gostin/Bloche response focuses on revealing the classical 
liberal politics that underlies the emerging critique. But that only 
takes us so far. 
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C. An Epidemiological Conception of Public Bads 
The population focus of epidemiology provides a unique lens for 
analyzing legal problems, similar to that provided by economics.243 I 
propose that “epidemiological harms”—which I define as those for 
which causation can be established at the population level, but 
which are not necessarily traceable to any particular individual as 
either cause or victim244—should be understood as a type of public 
bad. A fundamental tension in the application of tort law as a tool 
for protecting the public’s health is that “the most potent 
determinants of a disease or injury are often those that are distal 
and incidental, observable only by comparing the incidence of a 
disease or injury in one population to that in another population 
which is not exposed to that variable.”245 As my examination of 
industry-wide public nuisance litigation indicates, tort law has 
struggled to find an appropriate framework for adjudicating claims 
arising out of these kinds of harms. For a variety of reasons, it is 
also difficult to motivate sufficient political will to address these 
harms, even when there is substantial scientific evidence 
documenting their burden on society.246 
My vision of epidemiological harms as public bads builds on the 
social epidemiological evidence that problematizes the voluntariness 
of supposedly “personal” health behavior choices. The classical 
understanding of public bads defines them primarily as indivisible 
harms inflicted on the public without consent.247 Epidemiological 
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harms can be partly conceptualized in similar terms, but in a way 
that is informed by social epidemiology. Ultimately, it comes down 
to how the harm is framed. If the public bad at issue in the obesity 
epidemic is the ingestion of large quantities of high-calorie, low-
nutrient food, then it is difficult to conceive of that interaction 
between the individual consumer and the food he or she eats in 
terms of an “indivisible” harm imposed without consent. On the 
other hand, if the public bad at issue here is an information and food 
environment that has been shown to increase obesity at the 
population level, the calculus looks different. There is no meaningful 
consent to the overrepresentation of fast food outlets and 
underrepresentation of full service grocery stores in low-income 
neighborhoods. There is no meaningful consent to exposure to 
advertising on the sides of city busses extolling the virtues of dollar-
menu cheeseburgers. Social epidemiology also suggests that these 
harms are indivisible, in much the same way that the pollution 
emitted from a copper smelting mill affects an entire community. 
Scientific study can establish links between the social environment 
and health outcomes at the population level, but not at the 
individual level.  
Protecting public health also requires actions that no individual 
is fully incentivized to take, even if it were within one’s power to do 
so, because it is impossible to know which individuals will benefit. 
Indeed, the collective action problem in public health is the very root 
of its frequent politicization. Geoffrey Rose, a prominent 
epidemiologist, characterized the central dilemma of public health 
as the “prevention paradox.”248 Interventions that have the greatest 
potential to improve health at the population level are virtually 
always impossible to link to individual benefits. We know that 
convincing people not to use tobacco saves lives. We can document 
how many fewer people are smoking today than were smoking in 
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the 1960s.249 We can even document the impact of cigarette taxes on 
smoking prevention.250 But it is impossible to point to any 
individual and say “this person’s life was saved because the 
cigarette tax was high enough to keep her from taking up smoking.” 
Similarly, we know that exposure to deteriorating lead paint causes 
intellectual impairment. We can document how many children have 
blood lead levels that are unsafe. At the population level, we may 
even be able to estimate how much intellectual disability is 
attributable to lead paint exposure. But it is exceedingly difficult to 
prove that any given individual would not be intellectually disabled 
but for her exposure to lead paint. 
By framing the issue in terms of the nonconsensual and 
indivisible nature of the social, economic, and environmental 
determinants of health, the epidemiological harms concept offers an 
approach to incorporating a communitarian vision of public health 
within a predominantly liberal legal framework. The liberal 
framework tends to discount social, economic, and environmental 
influences on individual choice in its efforts to emphasize the 
importance of individual autonomy. This position is no longer fully 
tenable in the public health context, in light of the findings of social 
epidemiologists. Epstein’s and Hall’s arguments for a division 
between the science and the law of public health do not present a 
viable solution to this conundrum. Rather, the solution is to root 
new public health law more deeply in the science of social 
epidemiology. Legal advocates must find more compelling ways to 
convey the power of scientific insights about the social, economic, 
and environmental determinants of health. These insights 
ultimately provide the strongest source of support for understanding 
an expanding range of health threats as legitimately public in 
nature and as amenable to structural solutions. 
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VI. Conclusion 
The emerging liberal critique of new public health law has far 
reaching implications. It calls into question the full range of 
strategies for using law as a tool to address modern public health 
threats outside of communicable diseases, environmental pollution, 
and contaminated food. Liberal critics apply their reasoning to “fat 
taxes,”251 tanning bed taxes,252 litigation against food 
manufacturers or retailers,253 tobacco control strategies that seek to 
associate social stigma with smoking,254 anti-poverty policies aimed 
at reducing health disparities,255 seat belt laws, firearms regulation, 
regulation of alcohol consumption, parental abuse and neglect, 
consumer product safety, and regulation of the fast food industry.256 
In many ways, the failed efforts of public health advocates—of 
“epidemiologists as litigators”—to use public nuisance law as a tool 
for public health offer a concrete context in which to examine how 
persuasive the liberal critique might be for courts, and possibly also 
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for policymakers. Public health advocates would be wise to cull 
insights from the public nuisance debate that might be helpful in 
the public health battles on the horizon. 
If the ecological model of public health intervention is 
ultimately going to gain political and legal traction, then advocates 
will have to find more powerful ways of justifying it in the face of a 
longstanding classical liberal political tradition.257 They must find 
new ways of conveying the impact of public health threats on 
communities—as distinct from the sum of the impacts on 
individuals within them. The gun violence that David Kairys 
described is not merely the aggregation of the effects of guns on 
individual friends and family members of those who are killed or 
injured. It is different in kind and it is described in ecological terms: 
“a climate of fear that undermines our communities and the positive 
sense of community.”258 The communitarian foundations of public 
health law and the insights of social epidemiology are unlikely to 
lead to revolution. It is not only infeasible, but also inadvisable, to 
attempt somehow to surmount the liberal tradition in American 
law. But that liberal tradition can and should be supplemented by 
the communitarian language of public health. Legal analysis using 
a lens that draws on the objectives and methodology of public health 
science offers a means for doing so. 
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